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    Book III

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    Chapter 4
    Previous Chapter
    I.--When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with
    the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, the
    Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges,
    and the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps. The
    reason for sending him was, that he desired that the pass along the
    Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel
    with great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. He
    permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in
    these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought some
    successful battles, and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassadors
    being sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace
    concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to
    winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of
    the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated
    in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides
    by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a
    river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other,
    which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He
    fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.

    II.--When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had
    ordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts
    that all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town
    which he had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung
    over it were occupied by a very large force of the Sedani and Veragri.
    It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the
    design of renewing the war and cutting off that legion. First, because
    they despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that
    not quite full (two cohorts having been detached, and several
    individuals being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose of
    seeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on account
    of the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their first
    attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the
    mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this
    was added, that they were indignant that their children were torn from
    them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the
    Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those
    parts to the neighbouring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the
    passes, but also as a constant possession.

    III.--Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the
    winter quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was
    sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions
    (since, as a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had
    thought he need entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoning
    a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council,
    since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the general
    expectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered
    with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to their
    relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by
    the enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this
    sort were delivered; that, "leaving their baggage, and making a sally,
    they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had
    come thither." To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving
    that measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to
    defend the camp.

    IV.--A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given
    for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on,
    the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from
    all parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at
    first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they
    cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any
    part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard
    pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were
    over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance
    of the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strength
    came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing
    to the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given
    to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the
    wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been
    stationed, and recover.

    V.--When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, without
    cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men,
    and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to
    demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were
    becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last
    extremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we
    have related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement
    with the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man
    of great skill and valour, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only
    hope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource.
    Whereupon, assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to the
    soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect the
    weapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, and
    afterwards, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and
    place in their valour all their hope of safety.

    VI.--They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all
    the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing
    what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking
    a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had
    entertained the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than
    the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the
    barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight
    the rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon
    the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and
    stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and
    fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was
    unwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into
    winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a
    different state of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn
    and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of that
    village, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposed
    or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the [country of
    the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there

    VII.--These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to
    suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae
    being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps
    defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set
    out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a
    knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The
    occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his
    winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon
    the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those
    parts, sent out some officers of cavalry and several military tribunes
    amongst the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and
    provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubii;
    M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, with T. Silius,
    amongst the Veneti.

    VIII.--The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of
    any of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti both
    have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed
    to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and
    experience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered
    along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession, they
    hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in
    that sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their
    detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that they should recover
    by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. The
    neighbouring people, led on by their influence (as the measures of the
    Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same
    motive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by means of their leading men,
    they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general
    consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the other
    states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had
    received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All
    the sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send
    a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive back
    his officers, let him send back to them their hostages."

    IX.--Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so
    far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime on
    the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from
    the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being
    quickly executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits,
    hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being
    informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they
    had committed, in that the ambassadors (a character which had amongst
    all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained
    and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to
    the greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things
    which appertain to the service of a navy; with the greater confidence,
    inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. They
    knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the
    approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the
    localities, [and] the small number of the harbours, and they trusted
    that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on account
    of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things should
    turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in
    their navy. They, well understood that the Romans neither had any number
    of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbours, or the
    islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and
    that navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in
    the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify
    their towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bring
    together as many ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar
    would at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies for
    that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the
    Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from
    Britain, which is situated over against those regions.

    X.--There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in
    carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that
    war; the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman
    knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after
    hostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally,
    lest if [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations
    should think that the same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since he
    reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily
    and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, love
    liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divide
    and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the

    XI.--He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to
    the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit
    the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance
    and repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae
    to their aid) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their
    ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve
    legionary cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries
    should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be
    united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three
    legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take
    care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. He
    appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels
    which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni,
    and the other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him to
    proceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens
    thither with the land forces.

    XII.--The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on
    extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an
    approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which
    always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships,
    because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed
    upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the storming of their
    towns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti,
    overpowered by the greatness of our works (the sea having been excluded
    by a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in
    height to the walls of the town), had begun to despair of their
    fortunes, bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very
    great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook
    themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by
    the same advantages of situation. They did this the more easily during a
    great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms,
    and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea,
    with its strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly few in

    XIII.--For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The
    keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could
    more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows
    were raised very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted to the
    force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The
    ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and
    violence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot in
    breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb;
    the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for
    sails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either
    through their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, of
    for this reason, which is more probable, that they thought that such
    storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could not be
    resisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough
    managed by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships was of such
    a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the
    oars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] the
    violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on their
    side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (so
    great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon
    easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily
    locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began to
    rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm
    more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the
    tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things
    was much to be dreaded by our ships.

    XIV.--Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much
    labour was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be
    prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be
    done them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up
    and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully
    equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed
    forth from the harbour, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear
    clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the
    soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned,
    what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that
    damage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets were
    built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian
    ships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our]
    lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell
    the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great
    service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a
    form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropes
    which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them and
    pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the
    ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily
    fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on
    their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire
    management of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest
    of the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had the
    advantage; and the more so because the whole action was carried on in
    the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more
    valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and
    higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea, were
    occupied by our army.

    XV.--The sail-yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down,
    although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each
    one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the
    ships of the enemy: and, after the barbarians observed this taking
    place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for
    that evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight.
    And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind
    blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move
    out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune
    for finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one by
    one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the
    intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted
    almost from the fourth hour till sunset.

    XVI.--By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea
    coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more
    advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in
    that battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval
    forces they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no
    place to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. They
    accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar,
    on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more
    severely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors might
    be more carefully respected, by barbarians: having, therefore, put to
    death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.

    XVII.--While these things are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius
    Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in
    the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and
    held the chief command of all those states which had revolted: from
    which he had collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days,
    the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their senate because they
    would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against
    us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of
    desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom
    the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from
    husbandry and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within his camp,
    which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix
    encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing
    out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had
    now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat
    taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a
    suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to
    the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following
    reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in
    battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chief
    command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favourable
    circumstance presented itself.

    XVIII.--After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he
    selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom
    he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and
    promises to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to
    be done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before
    them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties
    Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed
    from this--that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army
    out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying
    [him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that
    an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not to
    be thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things
    persuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the
    previous days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want
    of provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite
    precautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because
    in most cases men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced by these
    things, they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from the
    council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and
    hasten to [our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory were
    fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fill
    up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.

    XIX.--The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from
    the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (in
    order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to
    collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus
    having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly
    desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which
    they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates
    [of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the
    unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our
    soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not
    stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and our
    men with full vigour followed them while disordered, and slew a great
    number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped
    by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval
    battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states
    immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of the
    Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak,
    and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

    XX.--About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania
    (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and
    the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul),
    understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years
    before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and his
    army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with
    the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used
    by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and
    cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa,
    Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that
    border on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the
    territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates
    having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their
    strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged
    first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our
    men pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which they
    had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while]
    disordered, and renewed the fight.

    XXI.--The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates,
    relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole
    of Aquitania rested on their valour; [and] our men, on the other hand,
    desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their
    general and without the other legions, under a very young commander; at
    length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a
    great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the
    [principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly
    resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a
    sally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the
    Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst them
    there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be
    gained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, they
    send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a
    surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their
    arms, comply.

    XXII.--And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in
    another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted
    followers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association
    are these,--that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to
    whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous
    happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them,
    or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been
    found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had
    devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring to
    make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms,
    upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and a
    fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yet
    he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the same
    terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].

    XXIII.--Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into
    the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the
    barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified
    by the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days
    after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to
    combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors
    also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to
    Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whose
    arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with
    a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole
    period [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skill
    in military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of
    the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortify
    their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus
    observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small
    number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy both made
    excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for
    their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very
    conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was
    daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle.
    This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all
    thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

    XXIV.--Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and
    marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the
    centre, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They,
    although on account of their great number and their ancient renown in
    war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely
    fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any
    wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if
    the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat,
    they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and
    depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This
    measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans
    drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus
    having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their
    own delay, and by the reputation [_i.e._ for cowardice arising thence]
    had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of
    all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in
    going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of
    the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.

    XXV.--There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, by
    throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the
    rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not
    much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the
    soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance
    and character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were
    fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their
    higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round
    the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not
    fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an
    easy approach.

    XXVI.--Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate
    their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he
    wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought
    out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the
    camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a
    somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy,
    when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly
    arrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having
    demolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen
    by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout being
    heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited
    (which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more
    vigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs
    being despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the
    ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over
    the very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of
    the number of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of
    Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp.

    XXVII.--Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania
    surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in
    which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the
    Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the
    Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote
    nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand,
    neglected to do this.

    XXVIII.--About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly
    past, yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii
    alone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a
    treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war
    might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very
    different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that
    the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed
    and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and
    morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When
    Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun to
    fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the meantime seen, while our men
    were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from
    all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter
    quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and
    having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing
    them too far through those intricate places.

    XXIX.--During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down
    the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the
    soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together
    (opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it
    up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, with
    incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy]
    and the rear of their baggage-train were already seized by our men, and
    they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests,
    storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended,
    and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any
    longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their
    country, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led back
    his army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the Aulerci and
    Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.
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