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    Book VIII

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    Chapter 9
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    CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS

    PREFACE

    Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in
    a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my
    inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation
    of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be
    compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and
    recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions
    in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we
    see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them
    could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might
    the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in
    presuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all
    hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it
    is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published
    for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such
    achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that
    historians seem rather deprived of than furnished with materials. At
    which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can
    only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished
    them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed not
    only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a
    thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not
    even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; and
    though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in
    conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to
    those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those
    which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urge
    every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge
    of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one
    be put in competition with him. Farewell.

    I.--Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war
    incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers
    after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought
    him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile
    intentions, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was
    assigned: namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able
    to resist the Romans with any force they could collect in one place; and
    hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same
    time, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to
    prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any
    inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay the
    rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

    II.--That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar
    left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and set
    out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of
    January, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had
    stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the territories
    of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it.
    Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army
    into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who,
    possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be
    deterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike
    preparation, and forming combinations.

    III.-By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to
    an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our
    horse, whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before
    they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's
    invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns,
    was forbidden by Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage and
    corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make
    their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as
    were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the
    neighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or public
    alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in
    every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety
    of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both
    retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering
    to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, when
    they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to his
    friendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, without
    incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection,
    they did the same.

    IV.-Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour and
    patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the
    winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two
    hundred sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given
    instead of plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself
    returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensing
    justice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid
    against the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them.
    Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen
    days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of
    quarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former
    Commentary to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he
    marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

    V.--When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the
    Carnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted their
    villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to
    meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves
    against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several
    towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers
    to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up
    his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in
    houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the
    tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he
    sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not
    without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The
    Carnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of
    danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were
    driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the
    woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable
    number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighbouring
    states.

    VI.--Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the
    gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being
    convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence
    could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius,
    with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and
    being informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci
    (who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the
    neighbouring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and
    Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a
    general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the
    territories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the
    Remi: and moreover, considering that not only his honour, but his
    interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the
    republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion
    out of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his
    two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius
    for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the
    quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of
    the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his
    own toils.

    VII.--As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the
    Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops
    of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might
    learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring him
    back word that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had
    not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was
    general from all parts), but had been sent back to watch our motions.
    Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci
    were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the
    Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along
    with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and
    that they had chosen for their camp an elevated position, surrounded by
    a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the
    most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management
    of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by
    Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the
    name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the
    camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs,
    and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to a
    resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire
    of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was
    reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to
    encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a
    more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger
    force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by
    ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that
    season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other
    necessaries."

    VIII.--When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the
    concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans
    which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash
    resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use
    every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force
    and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished
    valour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen
    youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared
    with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for
    experience and valour. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it
    the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In
    order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance
    of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner: that
    the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the
    baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole
    train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such
    expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater
    number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this
    disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them
    within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

    IX.--When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar,
    saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array;
    either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with
    the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before
    the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to
    bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the
    enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep
    rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a
    rampart twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned to
    its height; and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with
    perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories
    high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid
    across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small
    parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of
    soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their
    height, might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater
    distance; the other, which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the
    rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling on
    their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a
    considerable height.

    X.-Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped
    that the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raise
    confidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make
    a distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be
    secured by the works with a very small force. In the meantime there were
    frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out
    between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German
    auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on
    the other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there
    happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity
    happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of
    private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country
    were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an
    inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes
    in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said had
    gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and though
    the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by their
    arrival.

    XI.-Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within their
    camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and
    that it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the
    place enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to
    Trebonius to send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which was
    in winter-quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his
    lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the three
    legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and
    other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard his
    foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of
    the enemy.

    XII.--As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was
    relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the
    Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of
    our horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered
    with woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first to
    decoy our men into the ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, to
    attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom
    that day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenly
    got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their weakness, in
    consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly,
    and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being by this means
    thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual
    in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the governor of their
    state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit
    on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of
    the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor
    would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarians
    were puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing
    the prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this
    loss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution,
    and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

    XIII.--In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in view
    of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In
    one of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the
    Rhine, to fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the
    marsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the
    rest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand to
    hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at a
    greater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and being often
    beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired into
    their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled farther. Their danger
    drew their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to
    judge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage, or more
    dejected by a trifling calamity.

    XIV.--After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the
    Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his
    legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all
    who were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them
    their whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly and
    confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast
    multitude of waggons, even when they have very light baggage), being
    overtaken by daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, to
    prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage
    had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it
    prudent to attack them when standing on their defence, with such a steep
    hill in their favour, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they
    could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was
    divided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he
    could not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass,
    which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by
    a small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army
    across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was
    fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his
    army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which he
    could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.

    XV.--The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position,
    though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to
    ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties,
    lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and
    therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they
    persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and,
    measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified.
    Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampart
    and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses
    bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and
    that they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same
    place without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a
    retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on
    which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up
    in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of
    which they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front
    of their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set
    them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon
    screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner
    happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

    XVI.--Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the
    intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that
    method to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a
    party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and
    that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our
    men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly.
    The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of
    flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able
    to see their horses' heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat,
    through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once of
    cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles,
    and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous
    ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the
    Roman foragers.

    XVII.--After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a
    certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had
    selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with
    which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the
    Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of
    corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew
    out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as
    usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of
    light infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he
    could.

    XVIII.--The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a
    level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every
    side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they
    surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good
    order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and
    willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On
    their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of
    effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and
    attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and
    did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise
    in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to
    themselves.

    XIX.--When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our
    men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, the
    rest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was engaged.
    The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, and
    continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot
    gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our
    horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the
    legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with
    the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time
    doubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first
    charge, became superior from this very circumstance that, though
    suddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the
    meantime the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrived
    with notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near
    at hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our
    men, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely,
    fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should let
    the legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose
    courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were
    themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap
    the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the
    greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whither-soever
    chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were
    vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the
    meantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to
    quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of
    quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our
    men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

    XX.--After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after
    the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so
    great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their
    camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action,
    though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his
    army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being
    informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who having
    escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the
    defeat, and learning that everything had turned out unfavourable, that
    Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off,
    imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a
    council in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send
    ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

    XXI.--This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the
    Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries
    for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and
    requested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy,
    which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before the
    engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his
    usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power
    of the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousands
    of their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to
    bring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the
    battle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; that
    Correus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, was
    slain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had never equal influence in
    the state with the giddy populace.

    XXII.--Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications,
    that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in
    conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they
    had persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were
    not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest;
    that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily
    transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such
    influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise
    a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition
    to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he was
    satisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves.

    XXIII.--The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to
    their countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from
    the other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the]
    Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except
    Comius, whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to any
    person's honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the
    assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius
    was tampering with the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar,
    thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that
    he would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put
    him on his guard by the attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with
    orders to have him put to death under pretence of a conference. To
    effect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When they
    came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken
    hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised
    at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by
    the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the first
    blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to
    fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received
    a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen,
    dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it
    was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any
    Roman.

    XXIV.--When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike
    nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make
    preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and
    fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to
    detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with
    himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius
    Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of
    Gaul, because it was rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and he
    did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that
    country, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He ordered
    Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which had
    been under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman
    colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians, similar to
    that which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cut
    off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulate
    the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but
    despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought it
    most consistent with his honour to waste his country both of
    inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his
    countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excluded
    from a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought on
    it.

    XXV.--After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every
    part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword,
    fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent
    Labienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its
    vicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little
    from the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never
    continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his
    army.

    XXVI.--In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received
    information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always
    continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state
    had revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the
    country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was
    approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was
    shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general
    of the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the
    enemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus,
    having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the
    legions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending
    several days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men,
    without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, he
    returned again to the siege of Limonum.

    XXVII.--At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many
    states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking
    hostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the
    proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring
    assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius,
    and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced to
    withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension
    from the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with
    all his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure
    from danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep
    a river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come
    within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of
    the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged it
    most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they did
    take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his
    cavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they could
    return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our
    horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, and
    attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with
    baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having
    executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

    XXVIII.--The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with
    orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should
    come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius
    Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill,
    encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops
    in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The
    enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and
    making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle
    was warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had
    conquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were following
    them, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of
    concluding the battle expeditiously by their own courage, fought most
    valiantly against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces
    would come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thought
    they had got a favourable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry.

    XXIX.-After the conflict had continued for some time with great
    violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot
    should by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in close
    order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarian
    horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breaking
    through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a
    loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before
    had vigorously engaged them, whilst they made resistance, being elated
    with joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round
    them as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or
    their arms to give a blow, so long did they continue the slaughter of
    the enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men in
    arms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took their
    whole train of baggage.

    XXX.--After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian
    (who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul, had collected from all
    quarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty,
    called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers,
    and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to the
    province with five thousand men, being all he could collect after the
    defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a
    former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the
    first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius
    went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be
    incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the
    depredations of a band of desperate men.

    XXXI.--Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes
    and those other states, whose forces he was informed had served as
    auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he had
    no doubt that they would be more submissive after their recent
    sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might be
    easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On
    this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in
    recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had
    never mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the other
    states, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean,
    and which are called Armoricae, influenced by the example of the
    Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delay
    comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories,
    wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself in
    the most remote parts of Gaul.

    XXXII.--But Crapes in conjunction with Literius, knowing that Caninius
    was at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not without
    certain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, whilst an army
    was in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up and
    down and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius had
    once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over the
    inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of new
    projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own
    and Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage
    to him and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on
    the inhabitants to join him.

    XXXIII.--After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived
    that all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which it
    would be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with no
    resistance; and, moreover, observing that the town's people were
    possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if they
    attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not
    escape our horse, nor even our legions; he divided his forces into three
    parts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention
    of drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the
    fatigue.

    XXXIV.--When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the
    recollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar
    consequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experienced
    that fatal event, cautioned them to make provision of corn; they
    therefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troops
    behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The scheme
    having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and Luterius,
    leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with
    the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of
    whom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to
    prevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also
    attacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For this
    reason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest he
    should be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing his
    garrisons in several places, should make them too weak.

    XXXV.--Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn,
    occupy a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intending
    from it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They chose each his
    respective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of the
    army to protect it; Luterius conveys the train with provisions into the
    town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road,
    about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths through
    the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heard
    by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out,
    having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with
    the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the
    convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled
    by different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived,
    they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man
    to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did
    not return to the camp.

    XXXVI.--After this success, Caninius learnt from some prisoners, that a
    part of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles
    off; which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the defeat
    of one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easily
    conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemy
    had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of
    the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in
    making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot,
    men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among
    the three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him.
    When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he
    had sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of
    barbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the
    higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made a
    sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence,
    he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a
    signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of
    the higher grounds. Upon this, the German horse observing the Roman
    colours, fought with great vigour. Immediately all the cohorts attack
    them on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them
    all, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken
    prisoner.

    XXXVII.--Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully,
    without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town;
    and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had been
    prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemy
    with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. The
    next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took upon
    him the siege of one side.

    XXXVIII.--In the meantime, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of
    the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have no
    opportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the other
    states, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraging
    language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came to the Carnutes,
    in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the war
    first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt,
    they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the
    sooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that
    treason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to
    punishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even to
    his own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, that
    he was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the
    clamours of the soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they
    alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to
    be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his
    head cut off.

    XXXIX.--Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius of
    what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town's
    people persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers,
    yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul
    in general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength but
    perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying on
    the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert their
    liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his
    command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold
    out for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend.
    He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants behind him,
    with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. He
    hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius.

    XL.--Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation,
    and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that the
    enemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and being
    likewise informed by the deserters that the townsmen had abundance of
    corn; he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided the
    valley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which
    Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning
    the current; for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no
    drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But
    the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the
    besieged could neither come to the river, nor retire up the precipice
    without hazard of their lives. Caesar, perceiving the difficulty,
    disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the
    easiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen
    from getting water at the river, which obliged them afterwards to go all
    to one place to procure water.

    XLI.--Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out on
    that part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was not
    surrounded by the river. Whilst every other person wished that the
    besieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that it
    could be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it he
    began to advance the vineae towards the mountain, and to throw up a
    mound, with great labour and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran
    down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded
    several of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred
    from moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity
    the difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, and
    move the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the
    only work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty
    feet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not
    with the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that
    could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the
    spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led
    to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger,
    not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a
    great number of men also died of thirst.

    XLII.--Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow,
    pitch, and dried wood; these they set on fire, and roll down on our
    works. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans,
    by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly a
    great blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down the
    precipice, striking against the vine and agger, communicated the fire to
    whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though they
    were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and labouring under the
    disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence of
    mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of
    our army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every
    man faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a
    manner as he could, that his valour might be the better known and
    attested.

    XLIII.--Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered
    the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretence of
    assailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged being
    frightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call off
    their armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on the
    walls. Thus our men, without hazarding a battle, gained time partly to
    extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the
    communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate
    resistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by
    drought, persevered in their resolution: At last the veins of the spring
    were cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By this
    their constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such
    despair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but
    the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length
    submitted.

    XLIV.--Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and
    being under no fears of being thought to act severely from a natural
    cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles if
    several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different
    places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment
    on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms
    against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their
    rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was
    taken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his
    captivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food
    for several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I
    have related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the hands
    of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, and
    threw himself on the honour of several persons, as he saw that he dare
    not remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy he
    deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a
    sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, a
    prisoner to Caesar.

    XLV.--In the meantime, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action
    among the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of the
    Germans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans,
    he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, amongst them, Surus, an
    Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valour and birth, and was
    the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time. Caesar, being
    informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success in
    all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns, [Celtic]
    Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in
    person to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by
    Marcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the
    latter part of the summer there. This affair he executed with his usual
    despatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent
    ambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs being
    concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry towards Narbo, and drew
    off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four
    legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius
    Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two
    he detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence
    throughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines
    of the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on
    the ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices,
    at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be
    without an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran
    through all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes,
    and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good
    opportunity of learning how every person was disposed towards the
    republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by
    the fidelity and assistance of the Province.

    XLVII.--Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions among
    the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence that
    Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For when
    Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates
    continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I
    before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon every
    commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in
    the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans,
    supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry,
    infested the roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing
    provisions to the Roman quarters.

    XLVIII.--Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse
    under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the
    enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valour which was pre-eminent
    in him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executed
    the more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laid
    ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came off
    successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus,
    through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with
    a small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn
    Volusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden,
    appealed to the honour of all about him for assistance not to suffer the
    wound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and,
    wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the
    commander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our men
    turn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse,
    rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh
    with great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer
    hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy.
    When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great
    impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death in
    striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped
    this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being
    severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losing
    his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having either
    gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part of
    his followers, sent ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that he
    would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antonius
    should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated
    that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be
    obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that
    his request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and
    accepted his hostages.

    * * * * *

    Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's
    transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do,
    because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus
    were consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no
    person may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army
    were at that time, I have thought proper to write a few words in
    addition to this commentary.

    * * * * *

    XLIX.--Caesar, whilst in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae,
    made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and to
    give none either hopes of, or pretext for, a revolt. For nothing was
    further from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging in
    another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out of
    the country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls would
    cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by
    treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leading
    men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection
    lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful
    battles) in obedience.

    L.--When the winter quarters were broken up, he himself, contrary to his
    usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest possible stages, in
    order to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend to
    them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood.
    For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favour of a man strongly
    attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend the
    election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men,
    who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's
    influence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road,
    before he reached Italy, that he was created augur, yet he thought
    himself in honour bound to visit the free town and colonies, to return
    them thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence in
    such great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommend
    to them himself, and his honour in his suit for the consulate the
    ensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius
    Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip
    Caesar of all honour and dignity: and that the consulate had been
    injuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior
    in votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by
    friendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him.

    LI.--Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns and
    colonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the first
    time he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted
    which could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, and
    every place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with their
    children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in every
    quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with
    entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph.
    So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks
    of the people.

    LII.--When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he
    returned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having
    ordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territories
    of the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made Titus
    Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclined
    to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made such
    journeys, as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by change
    of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by
    his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the
    contrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority
    to deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any
    story concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do anything in
    opposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause
    would be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius
    Curio, one of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defend
    Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if
    the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's
    authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should
    resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would
    be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but
    of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the
    consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating
    matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting.

    LIII.--This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was very
    great, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year,
    when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate,
    contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar's
    province, before the expiration of his command, and when the votes were
    called for, and Marcellus, who endeavoured to advance his own dignity,
    by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate went
    over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by
    this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest
    by enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with
    whatever they resolved on.

    LIV.--After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legion
    should be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war.
    But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For the
    first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it
    belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar,
    however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent the
    legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the
    senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was
    quartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the
    thirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had
    drafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed
    Caius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius
    Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would be
    most secure if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valour, and the
    Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by
    his armies.

    LV.--He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival,
    that the two legions sent home by him, and which by the senate's decree,
    should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over to
    Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy.
    Although from this transaction it was evident to every one that war was
    designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as long
    as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner,
    rather than have recourse to arms.
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