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    Cratylus

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    Chapter 2
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    PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus.

    --

    HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?

    CRATYLUS: If you please.

    HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus
    has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not
    conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but
    that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for
    Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of
    Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates?
    'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called.
    To this he replies--'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that
    would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have a further
    explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a
    notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could
    entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates,
    what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is
    your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far
    sooner hear.

    SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the
    knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of
    knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma
    course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and
    language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able
    to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I
    have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the
    truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus
    in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not
    really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means
    to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking
    after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good
    deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better
    leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

    HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and
    others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
    correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which
    you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give
    another, the new name is as correct as the old--we frequently change the
    names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for
    there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit
    of the users;--such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to
    hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.

    SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;--Your
    meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees
    to call it?

    HERMOGENES: That is my notion.

    SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;--suppose that I call a man a
    horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a
    horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the
    world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by
    the world:--that is your meaning?

    HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.

    SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is
    in words a true and a false?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?

    HERMOGENES: To be sure.

    SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false
    proposition says that which is not?

    HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?

    SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts
    untrue?

    HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.

    SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every
    part?

    HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.

    SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

    HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.

    SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true
    and false?

    HERMOGENES: So we must infer.

    SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
    name?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
    that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other
    than this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and
    countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ
    from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from
    one another.

    SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the
    names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us?
    For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to
    me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you.
    Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent
    essence of their own?

    HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my
    perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at
    all.

    SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such
    thing as a bad man?

    HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there
    are very bad men, and a good many of them.

    SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?

    HERMOGENES: Not many.

    SOCRATES: Still you have found them?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and
    the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

    HERMOGENES: It would.

    SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as
    they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

    HERMOGENES: Impossible.

    SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really
    distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras
    can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one
    man cannot in reality be wiser than another.

    HERMOGENES: He cannot.

    SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things
    equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his
    view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always
    equally to be attributed to all.

    HERMOGENES: There cannot.

    SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to
    individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment
    and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent
    essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating
    according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own
    essence the relation prescribed by nature.

    HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.

    SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or
    equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a
    class of being?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

    SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature,
    and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do
    not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the
    proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting;
    and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail
    and be of no use at all.

    HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.

    SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right
    way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will
    not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of
    speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural
    instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.

    HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.

    SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men
    speak.

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts,
    is not naming also a sort of action?

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had
    a special nature of their own?

    HERMOGENES: Precisely.

    SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be
    given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not
    at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success.

    HERMOGENES: I agree.

    SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with
    something?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or
    pierced with something?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?

    HERMOGENES: An awl.

    SOCRATES: And with which we weave?

    HERMOGENES: A shuttle.

    SOCRATES: And with which we name?

    HERMOGENES: A name.

    SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And
    you answer, 'A weaving instrument.'

    HERMOGENES: Well.

    SOCRATES: And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'--The answer is,
    that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of
    instruments in general?

    HERMOGENES: To be sure.

    SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will
    you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
    name?

    HERMOGENES: I cannot say.

    SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish
    things according to their natures?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly we do.

    SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing
    natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

    HERMOGENES: Assuredly.

    SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well--and well means like a
    weaver? and the teacher will use the name well--and well means like a
    teacher?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be
    using well?

    HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.

    SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?

    HERMOGENES: Only the skilled.

    SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using
    well?

    HERMOGENES: That of the smith.

    SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?

    HERMOGENES: The skilled only.

    SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

    HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.

    SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?

    HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.

    SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.

    SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the
    legislator?

    HERMOGENES: I agree.

    SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?

    HERMOGENES: The skilled only.

    SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only
    a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans
    in the world is the rarest.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he
    look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does
    the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which
    is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make
    another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according
    to which he made the other?

    HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.

    SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

    HERMOGENES: I think so.

    SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of
    garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all
    of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle
    best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the
    maker produces in each case.

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has
    discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must
    express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the
    material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought to
    know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their
    several uses?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to
    their uses?

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the
    several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to
    put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to
    make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a
    namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators
    will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he
    may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of
    the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and
    still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in
    Hellas or in a foreign country;--there is no difference.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not
    therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the
    true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that
    country makes no matter.

    HERMOGENES: Quite true.

    SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to
    the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or
    the weaver who is to use them?

    HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man
    who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether
    the work is being well done or not?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And who is he?

    HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.

    SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?

    HERMOGENES: The pilot.

    SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work,
    and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country?
    Will not the user be the man?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And how to answer them?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a
    dialectician?

    HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.

    SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the
    pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the
    dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be
    no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons;
    and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that
    not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name
    which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of
    things in letters and syllables.

    HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in
    changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more
    readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the
    natural fitness of names.

    SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you
    just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to
    share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the
    matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by
    nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

    HERMOGENES: Very good.

    SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
    That, if you care to know, is the next question.

    HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.

    SOCRATES: Then reflect.

    HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?

    SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and
    you must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists,
    of whom your brother, Callias, has--rather dearly--bought the reputation of
    wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you
    had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has
    learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

    HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating
    Protagoras and his truth ('Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras;
    compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book
    affirm!

    SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

    HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does
    he say?

    SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where
    he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same
    things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about
    the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call
    things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?

    HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at
    all. But to what are you referring?

    SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a
    single combat with Hephaestus?

    'Whom,' as he says, 'the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.'

    HERMOGENES: I remember.

    SOCRATES: Well, and about this river--to know that he ought to be called
    Xanthus and not Scamander--is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird
    which, as he says,

    'The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:'

    to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name
    Cymindis--do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina?
    (Compare Il. 'The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb of
    the sportive Myrina.') And there are many other observations of the same
    kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the
    understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax,
    which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within
    the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet
    means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you
    will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.)

    HERMOGENES: I do.

    SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of
    the names given to Hector's son--Astyanax or Scamandrius?

    HERMOGENES: I do not know.

    SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the
    unwise are more likely to give correct names?

    HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.

    SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the
    wiser?

    HERMOGENES: I should say, the men.

    SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him
    Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other
    name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.

    HERMOGENES: That may be inferred.

    SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than
    their wives?

    HERMOGENES: To be sure.

    SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for
    the boy than Scamandrius?

    HERMOGENES: Clearly.

    SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:--does he not
    himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,

    'For he alone defended their city and long walls'?

    This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of
    the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

    HERMOGENES: I see.

    SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?

    HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.

    SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his
    name?

    HERMOGENES: What of that?

    SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of
    Astyanax--both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have
    nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is
    clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and
    holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and
    indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined
    that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the
    correctness of names.

    HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be
    on the right track.

    SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion,
    and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course
    of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary
    births;--if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call
    that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a
    natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you
    agree with me?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.

    SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not
    play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be
    called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not
    the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does
    the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the
    essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

    HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names
    of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with
    the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of
    the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which
    we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be
    no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example,
    the letter beta--the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and
    does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator
    intended--so well did he know how to give the letters names.

    HERMOGENES: I believe you are right.

    SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the
    son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and
    similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is
    like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be
    disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may
    not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would
    not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell,
    although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the
    same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the
    etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction
    of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this
    need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of
    Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they
    have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their
    names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)--and yet the meaning is the same.
    And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are
    several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus
    (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a
    physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of
    mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in
    their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not
    say so?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow
    in the course of nature?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and
    are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an
    irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the
    class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of
    a horse foaling a calf.

    HERMOGENES: Quite true.

    SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called
    irreligious?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or
    Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly
    given, his should have an opposite meaning.

    HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains)
    who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps
    some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain
    wildness of his hero's nature.

    HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: And his father's name is also according to nature.

    HERMOGENES: Clearly.

    SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon
    (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the
    accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his
    continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable
    endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think
    that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his
    exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his
    reputation--the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be
    intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in
    seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the stubborn,
    or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is
    perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also
    named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops
    who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).

    HERMOGENES: How so?

    SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or
    foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon
    his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,
    --or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by
    all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus
    is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him
    are true.

    HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?

    SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in
    his life--last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his
    death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world
    below--all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine
    that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down
    by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into
    this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted.
    The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning,
    although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is
    divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and
    others who use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the
    nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to
    express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us
    and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in
    calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the
    God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois
    zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him
    son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect
    Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is
    the meaning of his father's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep),
    not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou
    nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are
    informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou
    oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the
    way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I
    could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more
    conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,--then I
    might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an
    instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.

    HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly
    inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

    SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration
    from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long
    lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom
    and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession
    of my soul,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the
    investigation of names--that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so
    disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can
    only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this
    sort.

    HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the
    enquiry about names.

    SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that
    we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which
    witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a
    natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be
    deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names,
    as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are the expression of
    a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour),
    or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had
    better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in
    the names of immutable essences;--there ought to have been more care taken
    about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more
    than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.

    HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and
    show that they are rightly named Gods?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well.

    SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:--I suspect that the
    sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many
    barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing
    that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they
    were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became
    acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to
    them all. Do you think that likely?

    HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed.

    SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?

    HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?

    SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this
    word? Tell me if my view is right.

    HERMOGENES: Let me hear.

    SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?

    HERMOGENES: I do not.

    SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who
    came first?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, I do.

    SOCRATES: He says of them--

    'But now that fate has closed over this race
    They are holy demons upon the earth,
    Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.' (Hesiod, Works and
    Days.)

    HERMOGENES: What is the inference?

    SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the
    golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am
    convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him
    be said to be of golden race?

    HERMOGENES: Very likely.

    SOCRATES: And are not the good wise?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise.

    SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called
    them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older
    Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly,
    that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the
    dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom.
    And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more
    than human (daimonion) both in life and death, and is rightly called a
    demon.

    HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what
    is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing
    eros with an epsilon.)

    SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name
    is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.

    HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

    HERMOGENES: What then?

    SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal
    woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old
    Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight
    alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the
    meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians
    and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is
    equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect
    the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy
    enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But
    can you tell me why men are called anthropoi?--that is more difficult.

    HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I
    think that you are the more likely to succeed.

    SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

    HERMOGENES: Of course.

    SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and
    ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's
    dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first,
    remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names
    as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii
    Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one
    of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on
    the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being
    omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a
    noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the
    alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been
    changed to a grave.

    HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals
    never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not
    only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and
    hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a
    opopen.

    HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am
    curious?

    SOCRATES: Certainly.

    HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order.
    You know the distinction of soul and body?

    SOCRATES: Of course.

    HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.

    SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the
    word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine
    that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul
    when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and
    revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body
    perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But
    please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be
    more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they
    will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?

    HERMOGENES: Let me hear.

    SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion
    to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?

    HERMOGENES: Just that.

    SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the
    ordering and containing principle of all things?

    HERMOGENES: Yes; I do.

    SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and
    holds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into
    psuche.

    HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific
    than the other.

    SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that
    this was the true meaning of the name.

    HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?

    SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body).

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a
    little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave
    (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life;
    or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to
    (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the
    name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the
    punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the
    soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies,
    until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the
    word need be changed.

    HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of
    words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like
    that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any
    similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.

    SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle
    which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,--that of the Gods we know
    nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give
    themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves,
    whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles;
    and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any
    sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not
    know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one
    which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the
    first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do
    not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the
    meaning of men in giving them these names,--in this there can be small
    blame.

    HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like
    to do as you say.

    SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?

    HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper.

    SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

    HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

    SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have
    been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to
    say.

    HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?

    SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of
    names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still
    discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia,
    and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should be called
    estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is rational
    enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that estia which
    participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have said esia
    for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who
    appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was
    natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those
    again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus,
    that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle
    (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore
    rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing
    can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and
    Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare
    say that I am talking great nonsense.

    HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?

    SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

    HERMOGENES: Of what nature?

    SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

    HERMOGENES: How plausible?

    SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of
    antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also
    spoke.

    HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

    SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and
    nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that
    you cannot go into the same water twice.

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the
    names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much
    in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to
    both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I
    believe, Hesiod also, tells of

    'Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.--the line is not found
    in the extant works of Hesiod.).'

    And again, Orpheus says, that

    'The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister
    Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.'

    You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of
    Heracleitus.

    HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but
    I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.

    SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a
    spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered
    (diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys
    is made up of these two words.

    HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?--of Zeus we have spoken.

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,
    whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

    HERMOGENES: By all means.

    SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original
    inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks,
    and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element
    Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps,
    not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double lamda
    and not with a sigma, meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos).
    And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from
    shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta have been added. Pluto gives
    wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out
    of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term
    Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their
    fears to call the God Pluto instead.

    HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?

    SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this
    deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of
    always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body
    going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and
    that the office and name of the God really correspond.

    HERMOGENES: Why, how is that?

    SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask
    you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines
    him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity?

    HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

    SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if
    he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

    HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would.

    SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I
    should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

    HERMOGENES: That is clear.

    SOCRATES: And there are many desires?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the
    greatest?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be
    made better by associating with another?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly not.

    SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been
    to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest
    of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine,
    is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he
    is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the
    inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends
    from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down
    there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will
    have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the
    soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a
    great deal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated
    state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are
    flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would
    suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.

    HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say.

    SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from
    the unseen (aeides)--far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all
    noble things.

    HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and
    Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

    SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here
    is the lovely one (erate)--for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and
    married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator
    was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer),
    putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the
    truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People
    dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,--and with
    as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their
    ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into
    Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means
    only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for seeing that all things in the
    world are in motion (pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches
    and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be
    truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she
    touches that which is in motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein
    showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she
    is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the
    present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other
    name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some
    terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?

    HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true.

    SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the
    power of the God.

    HERMOGENES: How so?

    SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any
    single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the
    God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,--music, and
    prophecy, and medicine, and archery.

    HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the
    explanation.

    SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony.
    In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and
    diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as
    well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same
    object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver
    from all impurities?

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the
    physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or
    in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which
    is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous
    (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him
    Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master
    archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical
    attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other
    words the alpha is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name
    Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they
    are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he
    moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians
    ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and
    makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in
    the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron,
    so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda is
    added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now
    the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who
    do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just
    now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the
    everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei Ballon,
    apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be
    derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is
    called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing
    (ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is
    often called by strangers--they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her
    smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy
    (artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity,
    perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as
    hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the
    Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

    HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

    SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious
    and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious
    explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your
    hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is
    simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in
    fun,--and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes those who drink,
    think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they have none. The
    derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphros), may be fairly accepted
    on the authority of Hesiod.

    HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an
    Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

    SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them.

    HERMOGENES: No, indeed.

    SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of
    Athene.

    HERMOGENES: What other appellation?

    SOCRATES: We call her Pallas.

    HERMOGENES: To be sure.

    SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from
    armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the
    earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing.

    HERMOGENES: That is quite true.

    SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

    HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?

    SOCRATES: Athene?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern
    interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the
    ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that
    he meant by Athene 'mind' (nous) and 'intelligence' (dianoia), and the
    maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed
    calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (Thou noesis), as
    though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (Theonoa);--using
    alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, and taking away iota and sigma
    (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The meaning is that the word
    theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou noesis, but the omitted
    letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean 'she
    who knows divine things' (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we
    be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this
    Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her
    the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered
    into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.

    HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?

    SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)?

    HERMOGENES: Surely.

    SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that
    is obvious to anybody.

    HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets
    into your head.

    SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of
    Ares.

    HERMOGENES: What is Ares?

    SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and
    manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which
    is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way
    appropriate to the God of war.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am
    afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the
    steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

    HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of
    whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall
    know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.

    SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and
    signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or
    liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with
    language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of
    speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means
    'he contrived'--out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, the
    legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and
    we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,'
    says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you
    may rightly call him Eirhemes.' And this has been improved by us, as we
    think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb
    'to tell' (eirein), because she was a messenger.

    HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying
    that I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at
    speeches.

    SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed
    son of Hermes.

    HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?

    SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is
    always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which
    dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and
    is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally
    to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the
    perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos (goat-
    herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and
    rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is
    speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is
    no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from
    the Gods.

    HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why
    should we not discuss another kind of Gods--the sun, moon, stars, earth,
    aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

    SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I
    will not refuse.

    HERMOGENES: You will oblige me.

    SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom
    you mentioned first--the sun?

    HERMOGENES: Very good.

    SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric
    form, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because
    when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always
    rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of
    which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), because he
    variegates the productions of the earth.

    HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)?

    SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.

    HERMOGENES: How so?

    SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon
    receives her light from the sun.

    HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?

    SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the
    same meaning?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old
    (enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his
    revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the
    previous month.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon
    neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when
    hammered into shape becomes selanaia.

    HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do
    you say of the month and the stars?

    SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because
    suffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from
    astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of
    the eyes (anastrephein opa).

    HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?

    SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro
    has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word.
    Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a
    difficulty of this sort.

    HERMOGENES: What is it?

    SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can
    tell me what is the meaning of the pur?

    HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.

    SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of
    this and several other words?--My belief is that they are of foreign
    origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of
    the barbarians, often borrowed from them.

    HERMOGENES: What is the inference?

    SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness
    of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the
    language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.

    HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.

    SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the
    word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the
    Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as
    they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words.

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for
    something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur
    and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which
    raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or
    because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds 'air-
    blasts,' (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux
    (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this
    moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer =
    aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be
    correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the
    air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth)
    comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly
    called 'mother' (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.)
    gegaasi means gegennesthai.

    HERMOGENES: Good.

    SOCRATES: What shall we take next?

    HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year,
    eniautos and etos.

    SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to
    know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai
    because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the
    fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,--
    'that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their
    turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)': this
    is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei,
    just as the original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the
    whole proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but
    has two names, two words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a
    single proposition.

    HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.

    SOCRATES: I am run away with.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed.

    HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you
    would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those
    charming words--wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

    SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;
    still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and
    I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and
    understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme),
    and all those other charming words, as you call them?

    HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

    SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my
    head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were
    undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search
    after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going
    round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and
    round and moving in all directions; and this appearance, which arises out
    of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature;
    they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and
    motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and
    change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into
    making this reflection.

    HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?

    SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been
    just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely
    indicated.

    HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it.

    SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a
    name indicative of motion.

    HERMOGENES: What was the name?

    SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis
    (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of
    motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome
    (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration
    (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if
    you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which
    is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world
    is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express
    this longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not
    noesis; but eta took the place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is
    the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now
    considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the
    soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things,
    neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word
    should rather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis
    (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the
    word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to
    know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of
    things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native
    growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must
    remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid
    motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous
    Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the
    Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is
    expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good
    (agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature;
    for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are
    swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for
    their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon.
    Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the
    just); but the actual word dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed
    to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For
    those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of
    nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating
    power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in
    all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the
    subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest,
    passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not
    penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which
    superintends all things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called
    dikaion; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as
    I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but
    I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery
    that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world:
    now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one
    comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because
    partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he
    has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I,
    'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon
    they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers,
    and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me
    with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of
    them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing
    (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature.
    And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the
    satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is
    down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest
    opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract'; but this is not very
    intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the
    abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all
    this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they
    say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and
    passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far
    greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to
    learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this
    digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.

    HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must
    have heard this from some one else.

    SOCRATES: And not the rest?

    HERMOGENES: Hardly.

    SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in
    the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think
    that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),--injustice (adikia), which
    is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle
    (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems
    to imply a battle;--this battle is in the world of existence, and according
    to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you
    extract the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and
    you may clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every
    stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise
    courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man)
    also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux
    (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth):
    thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because
    the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai).

    HERMOGENES: That is surely probable.

    SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure
    the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed
    by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and
    allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth
    ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance,
    which have still to be explained.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the
    possession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two
    omichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta.

    HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology.

    SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names
    have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping
    off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in
    all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take,
    for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must
    surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but
    thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often
    such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning
    of the word. Another example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought
    properly to be phigx, phiggos, and there are other examples.

    HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters
    which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be
    adapted to any object.

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like
    yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

    HERMOGENES: Such is my desire.

    SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a
    precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).' When you have
    allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the
    top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment
    --anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and
    anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at the
    top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words
    arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but
    kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for
    all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and
    this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia,
    or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be
    further illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have
    come after andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word
    which has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a
    strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia
    expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia
    (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a (alpha) not, and
    poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and
    movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly,
    or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes
    filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete
    will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion,
    then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the
    attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called
    arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have
    had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more
    eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay
    that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that
    if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right.

    HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a
    part in your previous discourse?

    SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an
    opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.

    HERMOGENES: What device?

    SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word
    also.

    HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these
    words and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.

    SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes
    (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former
    derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all
    sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the
    flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron.

    HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?

    SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity,
    and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron.

    HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind.

    HERMOGENES: How so?

    SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not
    the principle which imposes the name the cause?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names,
    and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?

    HERMOGENES: That is evident.

    SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise,
    and are not other works worthy of blame?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the
    works of a carpenter?

    HERMOGENES: Exactly.

    SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

    HERMOGENES: Of course.

    SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works
    which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

    HERMOGENES: That is evident.

    SOCRATES: What more names remain to us?

    HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and
    kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their
    opposites.

    SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may
    discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,--for it is a
    sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul
    accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are
    called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the
    world.

    HERMOGENES: That is probable.

    SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but
    you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for
    this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name
    intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal
    penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta
    instead of a nu, and so made kerdos.

    HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?

    SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable
    the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word
    in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that
    which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things
    and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end,
    lets things go again (luei), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and
    in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated
    lusiteloun--being that which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion.
    Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from ophellein, meaning that which
    creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a
    foreign character.

    HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?

    SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.

    HERMOGENES: Which are they?

    SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),
    alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes
    (hurtful).

    HERMOGENES: Good.

    SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm
    (blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold
    or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of
    censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly
    be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon.

    HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names;
    and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are
    making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene.

    SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not
    mine.

    HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?

    SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?--let me remark, Hermogenes, how
    right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words
    by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will
    sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon,
    which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say
    to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and
    disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also
    of zemiodes, which in the old language is clearly indicated.

    HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved
    the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative
    of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and
    delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.

    HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

    SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either
    imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).

    HERMOGENES: That is true.

    SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of
    the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for
    (imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is
    therefore called imera, from imeros, desire.

    HERMOGENES: Clearly.

    SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the
    meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera
    because it makes things gentle (emera different accents).

    HERMOGENES: Such is my view.

    SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?

    HERMOGENES: They did so.

    SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,--it ought to be duogon, which
    word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of
    drawing;--this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other
    examples of similar changes.

    HERMOGENES: There are.

    SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the
    word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other
    appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is,
    nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own
    brother of blaberon.

    HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.

    SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be
    the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon
    into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other
    words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term
    of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all
    these various appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous),
    lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron
    (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the
    ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining
    and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated
    by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into
    delta as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you
    will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion).

    HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia
    (desire), and the like, Socrates?

    SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty
    about them--edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage;
    and the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been
    altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the
    relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is
    the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not
    mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous);
    odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon
    (vexation) 'the word too labours,' as any one may see; chara (joy) is the
    very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis
    (delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul,
    which may be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has
    been altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia
    explain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been
    changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving
    (pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon
    iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is
    called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire)
    denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes--
    because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things
    and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros from
    possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of that
    which is not present but absent, and in another place (pou); this is the
    reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as imeros is to
    things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in (esron) from
    without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through
    the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time
    when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is
    substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word?

    HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words?

    SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the
    march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a
    bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis
    (thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the
    soul to the essential nature of each thing--just as boule (counsel) has to
    do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of
    aiming and deliberating--all these words seem to follow doxa, and all
    involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on the
    other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or
    proposal, or object.

    HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I
    have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion
    (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and
    unresisting--the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as
    I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will;
    but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error
    and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is
    impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion--and this is the
    derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a
    ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you
    will persevere with your questions.

    HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as
    aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to
    enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion,
    has this name of onoma.

    SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?

    HERMOGENES: Yes;--meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).

    SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on
    ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in
    onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is
    that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an
    agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion
    of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is
    another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction,
    which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the original meaning of the word
    is disguised by the addition of psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota
    broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (on) is also
    moving (ion), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise
    called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion).

    HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some
    one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and doun?--
    show me their fitness.

    SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already
    suggested.

    HERMOGENES: What way?

    SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign
    origin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this
    kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have
    been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of
    ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with
    that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue.

    HERMOGENES: Very likely.

    SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest
    attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person
    go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out
    of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process,
    he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the
    enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the
    elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to
    be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we
    were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And
    probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of others.
    But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we
    shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element,
    which need not be resolved any further.

    HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right.

    SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn
    out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined
    according to some new method?

    HERMOGENES: Very likely.

    SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this
    conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again
    say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in
    stating the principle of primary names.

    HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.

    SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is
    applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary--when they are
    regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.

    HERMOGENES: Certainly not.

    SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to
    indicate the nature of things.

    HERMOGENES: Of course.

    SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the
    secondary names, is implied in their being names.

    HERMOGENES: Surely.

    SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from
    the primary.

    HERMOGENES: That is evident.

    SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede
    analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which
    they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a
    question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to
    communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make
    signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

    HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our
    hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and
    downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we
    were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make
    our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.

    HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else.

    SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever
    express anything.

    HERMOGENES: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or
    tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we
    want to express.

    HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think.

    SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal
    imitator names or imitates?

    HERMOGENES: I think so.

    SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached
    the truth as yet.

    HERMOGENES: Why not?

    SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people
    who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they
    imitate.

    HERMOGENES: Quite true.

    SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

    HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me,
    Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

    SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,
    although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music
    imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the
    matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have
    colour?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with
    imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and
    drawing?

    HERMOGENES: True.

    SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a
    colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well
    as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

    HERMOGENES: I should think so.

    SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in
    letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

    HERMOGENES: Quite so.

    SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave
    to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

    HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver,
    of whom we are in search.

    SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to
    consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about
    which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the
    nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the
    essence or not.

    HERMOGENES: Very good.

    SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

    HERMOGENES: There must be others.

    SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and
    where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by
    syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the
    letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the
    powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have done
    so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

    HERMOGENES: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating
    the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither
    vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the received
    distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels,
    nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And
    when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them
    names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to
    which they may be all referred (cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their
    natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in
    the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how
    to apply them to what they resemble--whether one letter is used to denote
    one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just,
    as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses
    purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours,
    as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that
    kind--he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so,
    too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single
    letters when required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables,
    as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at
    last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large
    and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make
    speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art.
    Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away--
    meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients
    formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like
    manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we
    must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are
    rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear
    Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.

    HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe.

    SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them
    in this way? for I am certain that I should not.

    HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able.

    SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we
    can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying
    by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about
    them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in
    this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the
    higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to
    any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we
    must do as well as we can. What do you think?

    HERMOGENES: I very much approve.

    SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so
    find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be
    avoided--there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of
    first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like
    the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air;
    and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the
    Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the
    best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of
    deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than
    we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is
    the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only
    ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And
    yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance
    of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly
    then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid
    explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk
    nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

    HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and
    ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire,
    and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which
    you may have.

    HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best.

    SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the
    general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet
    explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for
    the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed
    epsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai.
    And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding
    modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and allowing for the
    change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have kinesis, which
    should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or
    eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the letter rho, as I was
    saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the
    expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose:
    for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents motion by rho;
    also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words
    such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein
    (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of
    movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I
    imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at
    rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order
    to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle
    elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter
    iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of
    letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronunciation is accompanied
    by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such
    notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be
    shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names
    when he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He seems to have
    thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of
    delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further
    observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation of which the
    tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in
    leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon
    (sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of
    gamma detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the
    notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes.
    The nu he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a
    notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos:
    alpha he assigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they
    are great letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there
    is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the
    legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing
    on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other
    signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should
    like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

    HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies
    me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is
    this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or
    not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree
    in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better
    of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will
    either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

    CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can
    learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any
    rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest
    of all.

    HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, 'to add
    little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you
    can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little
    trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon
    you.

    SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which
    Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say
    what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly
    accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you have found
    some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and
    have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of
    names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.

    CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of
    these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I
    fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to
    say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,--

    'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,
    You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.'

    And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much
    to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may
    have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

    SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom;
    I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself
    What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception--when the
    deceiver is always at home and always with you--it is quite terrible, and
    therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to 'look fore and
    aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are
    we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of
    the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven?

    CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite
    true.

    SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

    CRATYLUS: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And who are they?

    CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

    SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me
    explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures,
    better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better
    sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

    CRATYLUS: True.

    SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better
    and some worse?

    CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.

    SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others
    worse?

    CRATYLUS: No, indeed.

    SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?

    CRATYLUS: Certainly not.

    SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?

    CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.

    SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,
    which was mentioned before:--assuming that he has nothing of the nature of
    Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at
    all?

    CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only
    appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the
    nature which corresponds to it.

    SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even
    speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him
    Hermogenes, if he is not.

    CRATYLUS: What do you mean?

    SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this
    is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in
    all ages.

    CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say
    something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which
    is not?

    SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I
    should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think
    that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

    CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said.

    SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting
    you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian
    stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'--these words, whether spoken, said,
    uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our
    friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

    CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking
    nonsense.

    SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me
    whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly
    false:--which is all that I want to know.

    CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no
    purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of
    hammering at a brazen pot.

    SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-
    point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing
    named?

    CRATYLUS: I should.

    SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation
    of the thing?

    CRATYLUS: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things,
    but in another way?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you.
    Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures
    or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of
    which they are the imitation.

    CRATYLUS: They are.

    SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness
    of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?

    CRATYLUS: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the
    woman, and of the woman to the man?

    CRATYLUS: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

    CRATYLUS: Only the first.

    SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each
    that which belongs to them and is like them?

    CRATYLUS: That is my view.

    SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a
    good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the
    first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call
    right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other
    mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in
    the case of names, false as well as wrong.

    CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be
    wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names--they must be always right.

    SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to
    him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the
    likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense
    of sight.

    CRATYLUS: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'?--
    for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him--
    'This is your name'? and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the
    imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man'; or of a female of the
    human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not
    all that quite possible?

    CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say,
    Granted.

    SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be
    disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to
    objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong
    assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of
    names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and
    if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them.
    What do you say, Cratylus?

    CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true.

    SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in
    pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or
    you may not give them all--some may be wanting; or there may be too many or
    too much of them--may there not?

    CRATYLUS: Very true.

    SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he
    who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the
    nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good
    image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a
    little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some
    names are well and others ill made.

    CRATYLUS: That is true.

    SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be
    bad?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be
    bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?

    CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is
    different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or
    beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract,
    or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written
    wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other
    than a name.

    SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

    CRATYLUS: How so?

    SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which
    must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten
    at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of
    any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or
    to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that
    the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer
    be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them
    shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will
    suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a
    painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an
    inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and
    into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a
    word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form;
    would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that
    there were two Cratyluses?

    CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

    SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle
    of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no
    longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive
    that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact
    counterpart of the realities which they represent?

    CRATYLUS: Yes, I see.

    SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things,
    if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of
    them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which
    were the realities.

    CRATYLUS: Quite true.

    SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may
    be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name
    shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional
    substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a
    sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not
    appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and
    described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are
    describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by
    Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the
    letters.

    CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.

    SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some
    of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;--well, if
    all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I
    think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in
    Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by
    truth herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out
    some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name
    is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both,
    you will be inconsistent with yourself.

    CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very
    reasonable.

    SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a
    name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names
    which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up
    of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there
    will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and
    formation of the word: you would admit that?

    CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you,
    since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a
    name at all.

    SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

    CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.

    SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some
    derived?

    CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.

    SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are
    representations of things, is there any better way of framing
    representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you
    can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say
    that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed
    about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them,
    and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our
    present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you
    call small great and great small--that, they would say, makes no
    difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you
    prefer?

    CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than
    representation by any chance sign.

    SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters
    out of which the first names are composed must also be like things.
    Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever
    compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not
    pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which
    the picture is composed?

    CRATYLUS: Impossible.

    SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing,
    unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree
    of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And
    the original elements are letters?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were
    saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is
    expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in
    saying so?

    CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.

    SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and
    the like?

    CRATYLUS: There again you were right.

    SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes,
    is by the Eretrians called skleroter.

    CRATYLUS: Very true.

    SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the
    same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in
    sigma, or is there no significance to one of us?

    CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.

    SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?

    CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like.

    SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?

    CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.

    SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is
    expressive not of hardness but of softness.

    CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and
    should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my
    opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon
    occasion.

    SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I
    say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.

    CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.

    SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I
    understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this
    is what you are saying?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication
    given by me to you?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as
    from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true,
    then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a
    name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are
    indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by
    custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from
    convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words
    is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the
    unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus
    (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and
    convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our
    thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever
    imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every
    individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and
    agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I
    quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things;
    but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a
    shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of
    convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could
    always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate,
    this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the
    most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what
    is the use of them?

    CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform:
    the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which
    are expressed by them.

    SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so
    also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other,
    because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or
    science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know
    things.

    CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.

    SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about
    things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort
    of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

    CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of
    information about them; there can be no other.

    SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who
    discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method
    of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery.

    CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery
    are of the same nature as instruction.

    SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in
    the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of
    being deceived?

    CRATYLUS: How so?

    SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his
    conception of the things which they signified--did he not?

    CRATYLUS: True.

    SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according
    to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find
    ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?

    CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely
    have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all?
    And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof
    is--that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that
    all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?

    SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in
    error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original
    error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more
    than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw
    in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long
    deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should
    expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first
    principles:--are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has
    duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to
    find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our
    former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and
    progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do
    you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

    CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.

    SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous
    this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than
    going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at
    present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota
    instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example:
    bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not
    of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the
    stopping (istanai) of the stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly
    indicates cessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may
    see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as
    amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their
    etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words which
    have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumpheresthai);
    and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia, for amathia may be
    explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois
    pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the
    worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those
    which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble
    might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not
    that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is
    the opposite of motion.

    CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion.

    SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is
    correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever
    sort there are most, those are the true ones?

    CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable.

    SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and
    proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think
    with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names
    in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the
    art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

    CRATYLUS: Quite true.

    SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of
    the first names, know or not know the things which they named?

    CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.

    CRATYLUS: I should say not.

    SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were
    saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things
    which he named; are you still of that opinion?

    CRATYLUS: I am.

    SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a
    knowledge of the things which he named?

    CRATYLUS: I should.

    SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if
    the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our
    view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to
    discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.

    CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we
    suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before
    there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?

    CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that
    a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names
    which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

    SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired
    being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that
    he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we
    mistaken?

    CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.

    SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are
    expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a
    point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

    CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that
    they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what
    criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to
    which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another
    standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two
    are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

    CRATYLUS: I agree.

    SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be
    known without names?

    CRATYLUS: Clearly.

    SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there
    be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their
    affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For
    that which is other and different from them must signify something other
    and different from them.

    CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true.

    SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that
    names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they
    name?

    CRATYLUS: Yes.

    SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn
    things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn
    them from the things themselves--which is likely to be the nobler and
    clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of
    which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn
    of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed?

    CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth.

    SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect,
    beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things
    is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated
    in themselves.

    CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon
    by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same
    direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give
    them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was
    their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a
    kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us
    in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often
    dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or
    is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?

    CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so.

    SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is
    fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux;
    but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

    CRATYLUS: Certainly.

    SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing
    away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and
    retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

    CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly.

    SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same
    state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they
    remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and
    never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved.

    CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot.

    SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the
    observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that
    you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot
    know that which has no state.

    CRATYLUS: True.

    SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at
    all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing
    abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless
    continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge
    changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and
    if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge,
    and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be
    known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and
    the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not
    think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now
    supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the
    truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a
    question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or
    the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far
    trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge
    which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of
    unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine
    that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true,
    Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not
    have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and
    do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to
    learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

    CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I
    have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of
    trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus.

    SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give
    me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and
    Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

    CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to
    think about these things yourself.
    Chapter 2
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