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    Chapter 1
    Of all the works of Plato the Symposium is the most perfect in form, and
    may be truly thought to contain more than any commentator has ever dreamed
    of; or, as Goethe said of one of his own writings, more than the author
    himself knew. For in philosophy as in prophecy glimpses of the future may
    often be conveyed in words which could hardly have been understood or
    interpreted at the time when they were uttered (compare Symp.)--which were
    wiser than the writer of them meant, and could not have been expressed by
    him if he had been interrogated about them. Yet Plato was not a mystic,
    nor in any degree affected by the Eastern influences which afterwards
    overspread the Alexandrian world. He was not an enthusiast or a
    sentimentalist, but one who aspired only to see reasoned truth, and whose
    thoughts are clearly explained in his language. There is no foreign
    element either of Egypt or of Asia to be found in his writings. And more
    than any other Platonic work the Symposium is Greek both in style and
    subject, having a beauty 'as of a statue,' while the companion Dialogue of
    the Phaedrus is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity. More too than in
    any other of his Dialogues, Plato is emancipated from former philosophies.
    The genius of Greek art seems to triumph over the traditions of
    Pythagorean, Eleatic, or Megarian systems, and 'the old quarrel of poetry
    and philosophy' has at least a superficial reconcilement. (Rep.)

    An unknown person who had heard of the discourses in praise of love spoken
    by Socrates and others at the banquet of Agathon is desirous of having an
    authentic account of them, which he thinks that he can obtain from
    Apollodorus, the same excitable, or rather 'mad' friend of Socrates, who is
    afterwards introduced in the Phaedo. He had imagined that the discourses
    were recent. There he is mistaken: but they are still fresh in the memory
    of his informant, who had just been repeating them to Glaucon, and is quite
    prepared to have another rehearsal of them in a walk from the Piraeus to
    Athens. Although he had not been present himself, he had heard them from
    the best authority. Aristodemus, who is described as having been in past
    times a humble but inseparable attendant of Socrates, had reported them to
    him (compare Xen. Mem.).

    The narrative which he had heard was as follows:--

    Aristodemus meeting Socrates in holiday attire, is invited by him to a
    banquet at the house of Agathon, who had been sacrificing in thanksgiving
    for his tragic victory on the day previous. But no sooner has he entered
    the house than he finds that he is alone; Socrates has stayed behind in a
    fit of abstraction, and does not appear until the banquet is half over. On
    his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by
    Pausanias, one of the guests, 'What shall they do about drinking? as they
    had been all well drunk on the day before, and drinking on two successive
    days is such a bad thing.' This is confirmed by the authority of
    Eryximachus the physician, who further proposes that instead of listening
    to the flute-girl and her 'noise' they shall make speeches in honour of
    love, one after another, going from left to right in the order in which
    they are reclining at the table. All of them agree to this proposal, and
    Phaedrus, who is the 'father' of the idea, which he has previously
    communicated to Eryximachus, begins as follows:--

    He descants first of all upon the antiquity of love, which is proved by the
    authority of the poets; secondly upon the benefits which love gives to man.
    The greatest of these is the sense of honour and dishonour. The lover is
    ashamed to be seen by the beloved doing or suffering any cowardly or mean
    act. And a state or army which was made up only of lovers and their loves
    would be invincible. For love will convert the veriest coward into an
    inspired hero.

    And there have been true loves not only of men but of women also. Such was
    the love of Alcestis, who dared to die for her husband, and in recompense
    of her virtue was allowed to come again from the dead. But Orpheus, the
    miserable harper, who went down to Hades alive, that he might bring back
    his wife, was mocked with an apparition only, and the gods afterwards
    contrived his death as the punishment of his cowardliness. The love of
    Achilles, like that of Alcestis, was courageous and true; for he was
    willing to avenge his lover Patroclus, although he knew that his own death
    would immediately follow: and the gods, who honour the love of the beloved
    above that of the lover, rewarded him, and sent him to the islands of the

    Pausanias, who was sitting next, then takes up the tale:--He says that
    Phaedrus should have distinguished the heavenly love from the earthly,
    before he praised either. For there are two loves, as there are two
    Aphrodites--one the daughter of Uranus, who has no mother and is the elder
    and wiser goddess, and the other, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who is
    popular and common. The first of the two loves has a noble purpose, and
    delights only in the intelligent nature of man, and is faithful to the end,
    and has no shadow of wantonness or lust. The second is the coarser kind of
    love, which is a love of the body rather than of the soul, and is of women
    and boys as well as of men. Now the actions of lovers vary, like every
    other sort of action, according to the manner of their performance. And in
    different countries there is a difference of opinion about male loves.
    Some, like the Boeotians, approve of them; others, like the Ionians, and
    most of the barbarians, disapprove of them; partly because they are aware
    of the political dangers which ensue from them, as may be seen in the
    instance of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. At Athens and Sparta there is an
    apparent contradiction about them. For at times they are encouraged, and
    then the lover is allowed to play all sorts of fantastic tricks; he may
    swear and forswear himself (and 'at lovers' perjuries they say Jove
    laughs'); he may be a servant, and lie on a mat at the door of his love,
    without any loss of character; but there are also times when elders look
    grave and guard their young relations, and personal remarks are made. The
    truth is that some of these loves are disgraceful and others honourable.
    The vulgar love of the body which takes wing and flies away when the bloom
    of youth is over, is disgraceful, and so is the interested love of power or
    wealth; but the love of the noble mind is lasting. The lover should be
    tested, and the beloved should not be too ready to yield. The rule in our
    country is that the beloved may do the same service to the lover in the way
    of virtue which the lover may do to him.

    A voluntary service to be rendered for the sake of virtue and wisdom is
    permitted among us; and when these two customs--one the love of youth, the
    other the practice of virtue and philosophy--meet in one, then the lovers
    may lawfully unite. Nor is there any disgrace to a disinterested lover in
    being deceived: but the interested lover is doubly disgraced, for if he
    loses his love he loses his character; whereas the noble love of the other
    remains the same, although the object of his love is unworthy: for nothing
    can be nobler than love for the sake of virtue. This is that love of the
    heavenly goddess which is of great price to individuals and cities, making
    them work together for their improvement.

    The turn of Aristophanes comes next; but he has the hiccough, and therefore
    proposes that Eryximachus the physician shall cure him or speak in his
    turn. Eryximachus is ready to do both, and after prescribing for the
    hiccough, speaks as follows:--

    He agrees with Pausanias in maintaining that there are two kinds of love;
    but his art has led him to the further conclusion that the empire of this
    double love extends over all things, and is to be found in animals and
    plants as well as in man. In the human body also there are two loves; and
    the art of medicine shows which is the good and which is the bad love, and
    persuades the body to accept the good and reject the bad, and reconciles
    conflicting elements and makes them friends. Every art, gymnastic and
    husbandry as well as medicine, is the reconciliation of opposites; and this
    is what Heracleitus meant, when he spoke of a harmony of opposites: but in
    strictness he should rather have spoken of a harmony which succeeds
    opposites, for an agreement of disagreements there cannot be. Music too is
    concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and
    rhythm. In the abstract, all is simple, and we are not troubled with the
    twofold love; but when they are applied in education with their
    accompaniments of song and metre, then the discord begins. Then the old
    tale has to be repeated of fair Urania and the coarse Polyhymnia, who must
    be indulged sparingly, just as in my own art of medicine care must be taken
    that the taste of the epicure be gratified without inflicting upon him the
    attendant penalty of disease.

    There is a similar harmony or disagreement in the course of the seasons and
    in the relations of moist and dry, hot and cold, hoar frost and blight; and
    diseases of all sorts spring from the excesses or disorders of the element
    of love. The knowledge of these elements of love and discord in the
    heavenly bodies is termed astronomy, in the relations of men towards gods
    and parents is called divination. For divination is the peacemaker of gods
    and men, and works by a knowledge of the tendencies of merely human loves
    to piety and impiety. Such is the power of love; and that love which is
    just and temperate has the greatest power, and is the source of all our
    happiness and friendship with the gods and with one another. I dare say
    that I have omitted to mention many things which you, Aristophanes, may
    supply, as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

    Aristophanes is the next speaker:--

    He professes to open a new vein of discourse, in which he begins by
    treating of the origin of human nature. The sexes were originally three,
    men, women, and the union of the two; and they were made round--having four
    hands, four feet, two faces on a round neck, and the rest to correspond.
    Terrible was their strength and swiftness; and they were essaying to scale
    heaven and attack the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils; the
    gods were divided between the desire of quelling the pride of man and the
    fear of losing the sacrifices. At last Zeus hit upon an expedient. Let us
    cut them in two, he said; then they will only have half their strength, and
    we shall have twice as many sacrifices. He spake, and split them as you
    might split an egg with an hair; and when this was done, he told Apollo to
    give their faces a twist and re-arrange their persons, taking out the
    wrinkles and tying the skin in a knot about the navel. The two halves went
    about looking for one another, and were ready to die of hunger in one
    another's arms. Then Zeus invented an adjustment of the sexes, which
    enabled them to marry and go their way to the business of life. Now the
    characters of men differ accordingly as they are derived from the original
    man or the original woman, or the original man-woman. Those who come from
    the man-woman are lascivious and adulterous; those who come from the woman
    form female attachments; those who are a section of the male follow the
    male and embrace him, and in him all their desires centre. The pair are
    inseparable and live together in pure and manly affection; yet they cannot
    tell what they want of one another. But if Hephaestus were to come to them
    with his instruments and propose that they should be melted into one and
    remain one here and hereafter, they would acknowledge that this was the
    very expression of their want. For love is the desire of the whole, and
    the pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time when the two
    sexes were only one, but now God has halved them,--much as the
    Lacedaemonians have cut up the Arcadians,--and if they do not behave
    themselves he will divide them again, and they will hop about with half a
    nose and face in basso relievo. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety,
    that we may obtain the goods of which love is the author, and be reconciled
    to God, and find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world.
    And now I must beg you not to suppose that I am alluding to Pausanias and
    Agathon (compare Protag.), for my words refer to all mankind everywhere.

    Some raillery ensues first between Aristophanes and Eryximachus, and then
    between Agathon, who fears a few select friends more than any number of
    spectators at the theatre, and Socrates, who is disposed to begin an
    argument. This is speedily repressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the
    disputants of their tribute to the god. Agathon's speech follows:--

    He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts: He is the fairest
    and blessedest and best of the gods, and also the youngest, having had no
    existence in the old days of Iapetus and Cronos when the gods were at war.
    The things that were done then were done of necessity and not of love. For
    love is young and dwells in soft places,--not like Ate in Homer, walking on
    the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft enough.
    He is all flexibility and grace, and his habitation is among the flowers,
    and he cannot do or suffer wrong; for all men serve and obey him of their
    own free will, and where there is love there is obedience, and where
    obedience, there is justice; for none can be wronged of his own free will.
    And he is temperate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires,
    and if he rules them he must be temperate. Also he is courageous, for he
    is the conqueror of the lord of war. And he is wise too; for he is a poet,
    and the author of poesy in others. He created the animals; he is the
    inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects; he is the fairest and
    best himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes
    men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and
    emptying them of disaffection; the pilot, helper, defender, saviour of men,
    in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love. Such
    is the discourse, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

    The turn of Socrates comes next. He begins by remarking satirically that
    he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied
    that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that
    they only say what is good of him, whether true or false. He begs to be
    absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth, and
    proposes to begin by questioning Agathon. The result of his questions may
    be summed up as follows:--

    Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is
    or has; for no man desires that which he is or has. And love is of the
    beautiful, and therefore has not the beautiful. And the beautiful is the
    good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants
    and desires the good. Socrates professes to have asked the same questions
    and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of
    Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his
    works. Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that Love is a mighty god and
    also fair, and she had shown him in return that Love was neither, but in a
    mean between fair and foul, good and evil, and not a god at all, but only a
    great demon or intermediate power (compare the speech of Eryximachus) who
    conveys to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the

    Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? To this Diotima replies
    that he is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of
    both, and is full and starved by turns. Like his mother he is poor and
    squalid, lying on mats at doors (compare the speech of Pausanias); like his
    father he is bold and strong, and full of arts and resources. Further, he
    is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge:--in this he resembles the
    philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. Such
    is the nature of Love, who is not to be confused with the beloved.

    But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he
    desire of the beautiful? He desires, of course, the possession of the
    beautiful;--but what is given by that? For the beautiful let us substitute
    the good, and we have no difficulty in seeing the possession of the good to
    be happiness, and Love to be the desire of happiness, although the meaning
    of the word has been too often confined to one kind of love. And Love
    desires not only the good, but the everlasting possession of the good. Why
    then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? Because all men
    and women at a certain age are desirous of bringing to the birth. And love
    is not of beauty only, but of birth in beauty; this is the principle of
    immortality in a mortal creature. When beauty approaches, then the
    conceiving power is benign and diffuse; when foulness, she is averted and

    But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals?
    Because they too have an instinct of immortality. Even in the same
    individual there is a perpetual succession as well of the parts of the
    material body as of the thoughts and desires of the mind; nay, even
    knowledge comes and goes. There is no sameness of existence, but the new
    mortality is always taking the place of the old. This is the reason why
    parents love their children--for the sake of immortality; and this is why
    men love the immortality of fame. For the creative soul creates not
    children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue, such as poets and other
    creators have invented. And the noblest creations of all are those of
    legislators, in honour of whom temples have been raised. Who would not
    sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?
    (Compare Bacon's Essays, 8:--'Certainly the best works and of greatest
    merit for the public have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men;
    which both in affection and means have married and endowed the public.')

    I will now initiate you, she said, into the greater mysteries; for he who
    would proceed in due course should love first one fair form, and then many,
    and learn the connexion of them; and from beautiful bodies he should
    proceed to beautiful minds, and the beauty of laws and institutions, until
    he perceives that all beauty is of one kindred; and from institutions he
    should go on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him
    of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the
    everlasting nature which is the cause of all, and will be near the end. In
    the contemplation of that supreme being of love he will be purified of
    earthly leaven, and will behold beauty, not with the bodily eye, but with
    the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true creations of virtue and
    wisdom, and be the friend of God and heir of immortality.

    Such, Phaedrus, is the tale which I heard from the stranger of Mantinea,
    and which you may call the encomium of love, or what you please.

    The company applaud the speech of Socrates, and Aristophanes is about to
    say something, when suddenly a band of revellers breaks into the court, and
    the voice of Alcibiades is heard asking for Agathon. He is led in drunk,
    and welcomed by Agathon, whom he has come to crown with a garland. He is
    placed on a couch at his side, but suddenly, on recognizing Socrates, he
    starts up, and a sort of conflict is carried on between them, which Agathon
    is requested to appease. Alcibiades then insists that they shall drink,
    and has a large wine-cooler filled, which he first empties himself, and
    then fills again and passes on to Socrates. He is informed of the nature
    of the entertainment; and is ready to join, if only in the character of a
    drunken and disappointed lover he may be allowed to sing the praises of

    He begins by comparing Socrates first to the busts of Silenus, which have
    images of the gods inside them; and, secondly, to Marsyas the flute-player.
    For Socrates produces the same effect with the voice which Marsyas did with
    the flute. He is the great speaker and enchanter who ravishes the souls of
    men; the convincer of hearts too, as he has convinced Alcibiades, and made
    him ashamed of his mean and miserable life. Socrates at one time seemed
    about to fall in love with him; and he thought that he would thereby gain a
    wonderful opportunity of receiving lessons of wisdom. He narrates the
    failure of his design. He has suffered agonies from him, and is at his
    wit's end. He then proceeds to mention some other particulars of the life
    of Socrates; how they were at Potidaea together, where Socrates showed his
    superior powers of enduring cold and fatigue; how on one occasion he had
    stood for an entire day and night absorbed in reflection amid the wonder of
    the spectators; how on another occasion he had saved Alcibiades' life; how
    at the battle of Delium, after the defeat, he might be seen stalking about
    like a pelican, rolling his eyes as Aristophanes had described him in the
    Clouds. He is the most wonderful of human beings, and absolutely unlike
    anyone but a satyr. Like the satyr in his language too; for he uses the
    commonest words as the outward mask of the divinest truths.

    When Alcibiades has done speaking, a dispute begins between him and Agathon
    and Socrates. Socrates piques Alcibiades by a pretended affection for
    Agathon. Presently a band of revellers appears, who introduce disorder
    into the feast; the sober part of the company, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and
    others, withdraw; and Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates, sleeps during
    the whole of a long winter's night. When he wakes at cockcrow the
    revellers are nearly all asleep. Only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon
    hold out; they are drinking from a large goblet, which they pass round, and
    Socrates is explaining to the two others, who are half-asleep, that the
    genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of
    tragedy ought to be a writer of comedy also. And first Aristophanes drops,
    and then, as the day is dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to
    rest, takes a bath and goes to his daily avocations until the evening.
    Aristodemus follows.


    If it be true that there are more things in the Symposium of Plato than any
    commentator has dreamed of, it is also true that many things have been
    imagined which are not really to be found there. Some writings hardly
    admit of a more distinct interpretation than a musical composition; and
    every reader may form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the
    strain which he hears. The Symposium of Plato is a work of this character,
    and can with difficulty be rendered in any words but the writer's own.
    There are so many half-lights and cross-lights, so much of the colour of
    mythology, and of the manner of sophistry adhering--rhetoric and poetry,
    the playful and the serious, are so subtly intermingled in it, and vestiges
    of old philosophy so curiously blend with germs of future knowledge, that
    agreement among interpreters is not to be expected. The expression 'poema
    magis putandum quam comicorum poetarum,' which has been applied to all the
    writings of Plato, is especially applicable to the Symposium.

    The power of love is represented in the Symposium as running through all
    nature and all being: at one end descending to animals and plants, and
    attaining to the highest vision of truth at the other. In an age when man
    was seeking for an expression of the world around him, the conception of
    love greatly affected him. One of the first distinctions of language and
    of mythology was that of gender; and at a later period the ancient
    physicist, anticipating modern science, saw, or thought that he saw, a sex
    in plants; there were elective affinities among the elements, marriages of
    earth and heaven. (Aesch. Frag. Dan.) Love became a mythic personage whom
    philosophy, borrowing from poetry, converted into an efficient cause of
    creation. The traces of the existence of love, as of number and figure,
    were everywhere discerned; and in the Pythagorean list of opposites male
    and female were ranged side by side with odd and even, finite and infinite.

    But Plato seems also to be aware that there is a mystery of love in man as
    well as in nature, extending beyond the mere immediate relation of the
    sexes. He is conscious that the highest and noblest things in the world
    are not easily severed from the sensual desires, or may even be regarded as
    a spiritualized form of them. We may observe that Socrates himself is not
    represented as originally unimpassioned, but as one who has overcome his
    passions; the secret of his power over others partly lies in his passionate
    but self-controlled nature. In the Phaedrus and Symposium love is not
    merely the feeling usually so called, but the mystical contemplation of the
    beautiful and the good. The same passion which may wallow in the mire is
    capable of rising to the loftiest heights--of penetrating the inmost secret
    of philosophy. The highest love is the love not of a person, but of the
    highest and purest abstraction. This abstraction is the far-off heaven on
    which the eye of the mind is fixed in fond amazement. The unity of truth,
    the consistency of the warring elements of the world, the enthusiasm for
    knowledge when first beaming upon mankind, the relativity of ideas to the
    human mind, and of the human mind to ideas, the faith in the invisible, the
    adoration of the eternal nature, are all included, consciously or
    unconsciously, in Plato's doctrine of love.

    The successive speeches in praise of love are characteristic of the
    speakers, and contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are
    all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads
    anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be
    regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax.
    They are fanciful, partly facetious performances, 'yet also having a
    certain measure of seriousness,' which the successive speakers dedicate to
    the god. All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical,
    but glimpses of truth appear in them. When Eryximachus says that the
    principles of music are simple in themselves, but confused in their
    application, he touches lightly upon a difficulty which has troubled the
    moderns as well as the ancients in music, and may be extended to the other
    applied sciences. That confusion begins in the concrete, was the natural
    feeling of a mind dwelling in the world of ideas. When Pausanias remarks
    that personal attachments are inimical to despots. The experience of Greek
    history confirms the truth of his remark. When Aristophanes declares that
    love is the desire of the whole, he expresses a feeling not unlike that of
    the German philosopher, who says that 'philosophy is home sickness.' When
    Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is
    alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (compare Arist.
    Nic. Ethics). So naturally does Plato mingle jest and earnest, truth and
    opinion in the same work.

    The characters--of Phaedrus, who has been the cause of more philosophical
    discussions than any other man, with the exception of Simmias the Theban
    (Phaedrus); of Aristophanes, who disguises under comic imagery a serious
    purpose; of Agathon, who in later life is satirized by Aristophanes in the
    Thesmophoriazusae, for his effeminate manners and the feeble rhythms of his
    verse; of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and
    great vices, which meets us in history--are drawn to the life; and we may
    suppose the less-known characters of Pausanias and Eryximachus to be also
    true to the traditional recollection of them (compare Phaedr., Protag.; and
    compare Sympos. with Phaedr.). We may also remark that Aristodemus is
    called 'the little' in Xenophon's Memorabilia (compare Symp.).

    The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs: Phaedrus and
    Pausanias being the ethical, Eryximachus and Aristophanes the physical
    speakers, while in Agathon and Socrates poetry and philosophy blend
    together. The speech of Phaedrus is also described as the mythological,
    that of Pausanias as the political, that of Eryximachus as the scientific,
    that of Aristophanes as the artistic (!), that of Socrates as the
    philosophical. But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato;
    --they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather
    than to assist us in understanding him.

    When the turn of Socrates comes round he cannot be allowed to disturb the
    arrangement made at first. With the leave of Phaedrus he asks a few
    questions, and then he throws his argument into the form of a speech
    (compare Gorg., Protag.). But his speech is really the narrative of a
    dialogue between himself and Diotima. And as at a banquet good manners
    would not allow him to win a victory either over his host or any of the
    guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously
    represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The
    artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession
    of ignorance (compare Menex.). Even his knowledge of the mysteries of
    love, to which he lays claim here and elsewhere (Lys.), is given by

    The speeches are attested to us by the very best authority. The madman
    Apollodorus, who for three years past has made a daily study of the actions
    of Socrates--to whom the world is summed up in the words 'Great is
    Socrates'--he has heard them from another 'madman,' Aristodemus, who was
    the 'shadow' of Socrates in days of old, like him going about barefooted,
    and who had been present at the time. 'Would you desire better witness?'
    The extraordinary narrative of Alcibiades is ingeniously represented as
    admitted by Socrates, whose silence when he is invited to contradict gives
    consent to the narrator. We may observe, by the way, (1) how the very
    appearance of Aristodemus by himself is a sufficient indication to Agathon
    that Socrates has been left behind; also, (2) how the courtesy of Agathon
    anticipates the excuse which Socrates was to have made on Aristodemus'
    behalf for coming uninvited; (3) how the story of the fit or trance of
    Socrates is confirmed by the mention which Alcibiades makes of a similar
    fit of abstraction occurring when he was serving with the army at Potidaea;
    like (4) the drinking powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which
    receive a similar attestation in the concluding scene; or the attachment of
    Aristodemus, who is not forgotten when Socrates takes his departure. (5)
    We may notice the manner in which Socrates himself regards the first five
    speeches, not as true, but as fanciful and exaggerated encomiums of the god
    Love; (6) the satirical character of them, shown especially in the appeals
    to mythology, in the reasons which are given by Zeus for reconstructing the
    frame of man, or by the Boeotians and Eleans for encouraging male loves;
    (7) the ruling passion of Socrates for dialectics, who will argue with
    Agathon instead of making a speech, and will only speak at all upon the
    condition that he is allowed to speak the truth. We may note also the
    touch of Socratic irony, (8) which admits of a wide application and reveals
    a deep insight into the world:--that in speaking of holy things and persons
    there is a general understanding that you should praise them, not that you
    should speak the truth about them--this is the sort of praise which
    Socrates is unable to give. Lastly, (9) we may remark that the banquet is
    a real banquet after all, at which love is the theme of discourse, and huge
    quantities of wine are drunk.

    The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself,
    true to the character which is given him in the Dialogue bearing his name,
    is half-sophist, half-enthusiast. He is the critic of poetry also, who
    compares Homer and Aeschylus in the insipid and irrational manner of the
    schools of the day, characteristically reasoning about the probability of
    matters which do not admit of reasoning. He starts from a noble text:
    'That without the sense of honour and dishonour neither states nor
    individuals ever do any good or great work.' But he soon passes on to more
    common-place topics. The antiquity of love, the blessing of having a
    lover, the incentive which love offers to daring deeds, the examples of
    Alcestis and Achilles, are the chief themes of his discourse. The love of
    women is regarded by him as almost on an equality with that of men; and he
    makes the singular remark that the gods favour the return of love which is
    made by the beloved more than the original sentiment, because the lover is
    of a nobler and diviner nature.

    There is something of a sophistical ring in the speech of Phaedrus, which
    recalls the first speech in imitation of Lysias, occurring in the Dialogue
    called the Phaedrus. This is still more marked in the speech of Pausanias
    which follows; and which is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely
    confused and pedantic. Plato is attacking the logical feebleness of the
    sophists and rhetoricians, through their pupils, not forgetting by the way
    to satirize the monotonous and unmeaning rhythms which Prodicus and others
    were introducing into Attic prose (compare Protag.). Of course, he is
    'playing both sides of the game,' as in the Gorgias and Phaedrus; but it is
    not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the
    fairness of his mode of proceeding. The love of Pausanias for Agathon has
    already been touched upon in the Protagoras, and is alluded to by
    Aristophanes. Hence he is naturally the upholder of male loves, which,
    like all the other affections or actions of men, he regards as varying
    according to the manner of their performance. Like the sophists and like
    Plato himself, though in a different sense, he begins his discussion by an
    appeal to mythology, and distinguishes between the elder and younger love.
    The value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and
    philosophy is at variance with modern and Christian notions, but is in
    accordance with Hellenic sentiment. The opinion of Christendom has not
    altogether condemned passionate friendships between persons of the same
    sex, but has certainly not encouraged them, because though innocent in
    themselves in a few temperaments they are liable to degenerate into fearful
    evil. Pausanias is very earnest in the defence of such loves; and he
    speaks of them as generally approved among Hellenes and disapproved by
    barbarians. His speech is 'more words than matter,' and might have been
    composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint
    given that Plato is specially referring to them. As Eryximachus says, 'he
    makes a fair beginning, but a lame ending.'

    Plato transposes the two next speeches, as in the Republic he would
    transpose the virtues and the mathematical sciences. This is done partly
    to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes 'the cause of
    wit in others,' and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into
    juxtaposition, as if by accident. A suitable 'expectation' of Aristophanes
    is raised by the ludicrous circumstance of his having the hiccough, which
    is appropriately cured by his substitute, the physician Eryximachus. To
    Eryximachus Love is the good physician; he sees everything as an
    intelligent physicist, and, like many professors of his art in modern
    times, attempts to reduce the moral to the physical; or recognises one law
    of love which pervades them both. There are loves and strifes of the body
    as well as of the mind. Like Hippocrates the Asclepiad, he is a disciple
    of Heracleitus, whose conception of the harmony of opposites he explains in
    a new way as the harmony after discord; to his common sense, as to that of
    many moderns as well as ancients, the identity of contradictories is an
    absurdity. His notion of love may be summed up as the harmony of man with
    himself in soul as well as body, and of all things in heaven and earth with
    one another.

    Aristophanes is ready to laugh and make laugh before he opens his mouth,
    just as Socrates, true to his character, is ready to argue before he begins
    to speak. He expresses the very genius of the old comedy, its coarse and
    forcible imagery, and the licence of its language in speaking about the
    gods. He has no sophistical notions about love, which is brought back by
    him to its common-sense meaning of love between intelligent beings. His
    account of the origin of the sexes has the greatest (comic) probability and
    verisimilitude. Nothing in Aristophanes is more truly Aristophanic than
    the description of the human monster whirling round on four arms and four
    legs, eight in all, with incredible rapidity. Yet there is a mixture of
    earnestness in this jest; three serious principles seem to be insinuated:--
    first, that man cannot exist in isolation; he must be reunited if he is to
    be perfected: secondly, that love is the mediator and reconciler of poor,
    divided human nature: thirdly, that the loves of this world are an
    indistinct anticipation of an ideal union which is not yet realized.

    The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain, and receives the
    real, if half-ironical, approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the
    tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of
    Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities. In the idea of the
    antiquity of love he cannot agree; love is not of the olden time, but
    present and youthful ever. The speech may be compared with that speech of
    Socrates in the Phaedrus in which he describes himself as talking
    dithyrambs. It is at once a preparation for Socrates and a foil to him.
    The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights,' but at the
    same time contrasts with the natural and necessary eloquence of Socrates.
    Agathon contributes the distinction between love and the works of love, and
    also hints incidentally that love is always of beauty, which Socrates
    afterwards raises into a principle. While the consciousness of discord is
    stronger in the comic poet Aristophanes, Agathon, the tragic poet, has a
    deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation, and speaks of Love as the
    creator and artist.

    All the earlier speeches embody common opinions coloured with a tinge of
    philosophy. They furnish the material out of which Socrates proceeds to
    form his discourse, starting, as in other places, from mythology and the
    opinions of men. From Phaedrus he takes the thought that love is stronger
    than death; from Pausanias, that the true love is akin to intellect and
    political activity; from Eryximachus, that love is a universal phenomenon
    and the great power of nature; from Aristophanes, that love is the child of
    want, and is not merely the love of the congenial or of the whole, but (as
    he adds) of the good; from Agathon, that love is of beauty, not however of
    beauty only, but of birth in beauty. As it would be out of character for
    Socrates to make a lengthened harangue, the speech takes the form of a
    dialogue between Socrates and a mysterious woman of foreign extraction.
    She elicits the final truth from one who knows nothing, and who, speaking
    by the lips of another, and himself a despiser of rhetoric, is proved also
    to be the most consummate of rhetoricians (compare Menexenus).

    The last of the six discourses begins with a short argument which
    overthrows not only Agathon but all the preceding speakers by the help of a
    distinction which has escaped them. Extravagant praises have been ascribed
    to Love as the author of every good; no sort of encomium was too high for
    him, whether deserved and true or not. But Socrates has no talent for
    speaking anything but the truth, and if he is to speak the truth of Love he
    must honestly confess that he is not a good at all: for love is of the
    good, and no man can desire that which he has. This piece of dialectics is
    ascribed to Diotima, who has already urged upon Socrates the argument which
    he urges against Agathon. That the distinction is a fallacy is obvious; it
    is almost acknowledged to be so by Socrates himself. For he who has beauty
    or good may desire more of them; and he who has beauty or good in himself
    may desire beauty and good in others. The fallacy seems to arise out of a
    confusion between the abstract ideas of good and beauty, which do not admit
    of degrees, and their partial realization in individuals.

    But Diotima, the prophetess of Mantineia, whose sacred and superhuman
    character raises her above the ordinary proprieties of women, has taught
    Socrates far more than this about the art and mystery of love. She has
    taught him that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the
    human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children,
    may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian
    might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine
    loves under the figure of human (compare Eph. 'This is a great mystery, but
    I speak concerning Christ and the church'); as the mediaeval saint might
    speak of the 'fruitio Dei;' as Dante saw all things contained in his love
    of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in
    the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather,
    perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of
    the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ.
    The first tumult of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were
    longings of a creature

    Moving about in worlds not realized,

    which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be
    antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of the greatest
    comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a
    contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age
    in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now
    become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme
    of the Symposium of Plato. And as there is no impossibility in supposing
    that 'one king, or son of a king, may be a philosopher,' so also there is a
    probability that there may be some few--perhaps one or two in a whole
    generation--in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire.
    And if there be such natures, no one will be disposed to deny that 'from
    them flow most of the benefits of individuals and states;' and even from
    imperfect combinations of the two elements in teachers or statesmen great
    good may often arise.

    Yet there is a higher region in which love is not only felt, but satisfied,
    in the perfect beauty of eternal knowledge, beginning with the beauty of
    earthly things, and at last reaching a beauty in which all existence is
    seen to be harmonious and one. The limited affection is enlarged, and
    enabled to behold the ideal of all things. And here the highest summit
    which is reached in the Symposium is seen also to be the highest summit
    which is attained in the Republic, but approached from another side; and
    there is 'a way upwards and downwards,' which is the same and not the same
    in both. The ideal beauty of the one is the ideal good of the other;
    regarded not with the eye of knowledge, but of faith and desire; and they
    are respectively the source of beauty and the source of good in all other
    things. And by the steps of a 'ladder reaching to heaven' we pass from
    images of visible beauty (Greek), and from the hypotheses of the
    Mathematical sciences, which are not yet based upon the idea of good,
    through the concrete to the abstract, and, by different paths arriving,
    behold the vision of the eternal (compare Symp. (Greek) Republic (Greek)
    also Phaedrus). Under one aspect 'the idea is love'; under another,
    'truth.' In both the lover of wisdom is the 'spectator of all time and of
    all existence.' This is a 'mystery' in which Plato also obscurely
    intimates the union of the spiritual and fleshly, the interpenetration of
    the moral and intellectual faculties.

    The divine image of beauty which resides within Socrates has been revealed;
    the Silenus, or outward man, has now to be exhibited. The description of
    Socrates follows immediately after the speech of Socrates; one is the
    complement of the other. At the height of divine inspiration, when the
    force of nature can no further go, by way of contrast to this extreme
    idealism, Alcibiades, accompanied by a troop of revellers and a flute-girl,
    staggers in, and being drunk is able to tell of things which he would have
    been ashamed to make known if he had been sober. The state of his
    affections towards Socrates, unintelligible to us and perverted as they
    appear, affords an illustration of the power ascribed to the loves of man
    in the speech of Pausanias. He does not suppose his feelings to be
    peculiar to himself: there are several other persons in the company who
    have been equally in love with Socrates, and like himself have been
    deceived by him. The singular part of this confession is the combination
    of the most degrading passion with the desire of virtue and improvement.
    Such an union is not wholly untrue to human nature, which is capable of
    combining good and evil in a degree beyond what we can easily conceive. In
    imaginative persons, especially, the God and beast in man seem to part
    asunder more than is natural in a well-regulated mind. The Platonic
    Socrates (for of the real Socrates this may be doubted: compare his public
    rebuke of Critias for his shameful love of Euthydemus in Xenophon,
    Memorabilia) does not regard the greatest evil of Greek life as a thing not
    to be spoken of; but it has a ridiculous element (Plato's Symp.), and is a
    subject for irony, no less than for moral reprobation (compare Plato's
    Symp.). It is also used as a figure of speech which no one interpreted
    literally (compare Xen. Symp.). Nor does Plato feel any repugnance, such
    as would be felt in modern times, at bringing his great master and hero
    into connexion with nameless crimes. He is contented with representing him
    as a saint, who has won 'the Olympian victory' over the temptations of
    human nature. The fault of taste, which to us is so glaring and which was
    recognized by the Greeks of a later age (Athenaeus), was not perceived by
    Plato himself. We are still more surprised to find that the philosopher is
    incited to take the first step in his upward progress (Symp.) by the beauty
    of young men and boys, which was alone capable of inspiring the modern
    feeling of romance in the Greek mind. The passion of love took the
    spurious form of an enthusiasm for the ideal of beauty--a worship as of
    some godlike image of an Apollo or Antinous. But the love of youth when
    not depraved was a love of virtue and modesty as well as of beauty, the one
    being the expression of the other; and in certain Greek states, especially
    at Sparta and Thebes, the honourable attachment of a youth to an elder man
    was a part of his education. The 'army of lovers and their beloved who
    would be invincible if they could be united by such a tie' (Symp.), is not
    a mere fiction of Plato's, but seems actually to have existed at Thebes in
    the days of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, if we may believe writers cited
    anonymously by Plutarch, Pelop. Vit. It is observable that Plato never in
    the least degree excuses the depraved love of the body (compare Charm.;
    Rep.; Laws; Symp.; and once more Xenophon, Mem.), nor is there any Greek
    writer of mark who condones or approves such connexions. But owing partly
    to the puzzling nature of the subject these friendships are spoken of by
    Plato in a manner different from that customary among ourselves. To most
    of them we should hesitate to ascribe, any more than to the attachment of
    Achilles and Patroclus in Homer, an immoral or licentious character. There
    were many, doubtless, to whom the love of the fair mind was the noblest
    form of friendship (Rep.), and who deemed the friendship of man with man to
    be higher than the love of woman, because altogether separated from the
    bodily appetites. The existence of such attachments may be reasonably
    attributed to the inferiority and seclusion of woman, and the want of a
    real family or social life and parental influence in Hellenic cities; and
    they were encouraged by the practice of gymnastic exercises, by the
    meetings of political clubs, and by the tie of military companionship.
    They were also an educational institution: a young person was specially
    entrusted by his parents to some elder friend who was expected by them to
    train their son in manly exercises and in virtue. It is not likely that a
    Greek parent committed him to a lover, any more than we should to a
    schoolmaster, in the expectation that he would be corrupted by him, but
    rather in the hope that his morals would be better cared for than was
    possible in a great household of slaves.

    It is difficult to adduce the authority of Plato either for or against such
    practices or customs, because it is not always easy to determine whether he
    is speaking of 'the heavenly and philosophical love, or of the coarse
    Polyhymnia:' and he often refers to this (e.g. in the Symposium) half in
    jest, yet 'with a certain degree of seriousness.' We observe that they
    entered into one part of Greek literature, but not into another, and that
    the larger part is free from such associations. Indecency was an element
    of the ludicrous in the old Greek Comedy, as it has been in other ages and
    countries. But effeminate love was always condemned as well as ridiculed
    by the Comic poets; and in the New Comedy the allusions to such topics have
    disappeared. They seem to have been no longer tolerated by the greater
    refinement of the age. False sentiment is found in the Lyric and Elegiac
    poets; and in mythology 'the greatest of the Gods' (Rep.) is not exempt
    from evil imputations. But the morals of a nation are not to be judged of
    wholly by its literature. Hellas was not necessarily more corrupted in the
    days of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, or of Plato and the Orators,
    than England in the time of Fielding and Smollett, or France in the
    nineteenth century. No one supposes certain French novels to be a
    representation of ordinary French life. And the greater part of Greek
    literature, beginning with Homer and including the tragedians,
    philosophers, and, with the exception of the Comic poets (whose business
    was to raise a laugh by whatever means), all the greater writers of Hellas
    who have been preserved to us, are free from the taint of indecency.

    Some general considerations occur to our mind when we begin to reflect on
    this subject. (1) That good and evil are linked together in human nature,
    and have often existed side by side in the world and in man to an extent
    hardly credible. We cannot distinguish them, and are therefore unable to
    part them; as in the parable 'they grow together unto the harvest:' it is
    only a rule of external decency by which society can divide them. Nor
    should we be right in inferring from the prevalence of any one vice or
    corruption that a state or individual was demoralized in their whole
    character. Not only has the corruption of the best been sometimes thought
    to be the worst, but it may be remarked that this very excess of evil has
    been the stimulus to good (compare Plato, Laws, where he says that in the
    most corrupt cities individuals are to be found beyond all praise). (2) It
    may be observed that evils which admit of degrees can seldom be rightly
    estimated, because under the same name actions of the most different
    degrees of culpability may be included. No charge is more easily set going
    than the imputation of secret wickedness (which cannot be either proved or
    disproved and often cannot be defined) when directed against a person of
    whom the world, or a section of it, is predisposed to think evil. And it
    is quite possible that the malignity of Greek scandal, aroused by some
    personal jealousy or party enmity, may have converted the innocent
    friendship of a great man for a noble youth into a connexion of another
    kind. Such accusations were brought against several of the leading men of
    Hellas, e.g. Cimon, Alcibiades, Critias, Demosthenes, Epaminondas: several
    of the Roman emperors were assailed by similar weapons which have been used
    even in our own day against statesmen of the highest character. (3) While
    we know that in this matter there is a great gulf fixed between Greek and
    Christian Ethics, yet, if we would do justice to the Greeks, we must also
    acknowledge that there was a greater outspokenness among them than among
    ourselves about the things which nature hides, and that the more frequent
    mention of such topics is not to be taken as the measure of the prevalence
    of offences, or as a proof of the general corruption of society. It is
    likely that every religion in the world has used words or practised rites
    in one age, which have become distasteful or repugnant to another. We
    cannot, though for different reasons, trust the representations either of
    Comedy or Satire; and still less of Christian Apologists. (4) We observe
    that at Thebes and Lacedemon the attachment of an elder friend to a beloved
    youth was often deemed to be a part of his education; and was encouraged by
    his parents--it was only shameful if it degenerated into licentiousness.
    Such we may believe to have been the tie which united Asophychus and
    Cephisodorus with the great Epaminondas in whose companionship they fell
    (Plutarch, Amat.; Athenaeus on the authority of Theopompus). (5) A small
    matter: there appears to be a difference of custom among the Greeks and
    among ourselves, as between ourselves and continental nations at the
    present time, in modes of salutation. We must not suspect evil in the
    hearty kiss or embrace of a male friend 'returning from the army at
    Potidaea' any more than in a similar salutation when practised by members
    of the same family. But those who make these admissions, and who regard,
    not without pity, the victims of such illusions in our own day, whose life
    has been blasted by them, may be none the less resolved that the natural
    and healthy instincts of mankind shall alone be tolerated (Greek); and that
    the lesson of manliness which we have inherited from our fathers shall not
    degenerate into sentimentalism or effeminacy. The possibility of an
    honourable connexion of this kind seems to have died out with Greek
    civilization. Among the Romans, and also among barbarians, such as the
    Celts and Persians, there is no trace of such attachments existing in any
    noble or virtuous form.

    (Compare Hoeck's Creta and the admirable and exhaustive article of Meier in
    Ersch and Grueber's Cyclopedia on this subject; Plutarch, Amatores;
    Athenaeus; Lysias contra Simonem; Aesch. c. Timarchum.)

    The character of Alcibiades in the Symposium is hardly less remarkable than
    that of Socrates, and agrees with the picture given of him in the first of
    the two Dialogues which are called by his name, and also with the slight
    sketch of him in the Protagoras. He is the impersonation of lawlessness--
    'the lion's whelp, who ought not to be reared in the city,' yet not without
    a certain generosity which gained the hearts of men,--strangely fascinated
    by Socrates, and possessed of a genius which might have been either the
    destruction or salvation of Athens. The dramatic interest of the character
    is heightened by the recollection of his after history. He seems to have
    been present to the mind of Plato in the description of the democratic man
    of the Republic (compare also Alcibiades 1).

    There is no criterion of the date of the Symposium, except that which is
    furnished by the allusion to the division of Arcadia after the destruction
    of Mantinea. This took place in the year B.C. 384, which is the forty-
    fourth year of Plato's life. The Symposium cannot therefore be regarded as
    a youthful work. As Mantinea was restored in the year 369, the composition
    of the Dialogue will probably fall between 384 and 369. Whether the
    recollection of the event is more likely to have been renewed at the
    destruction or restoration of the city, rather than at some intermediate
    period, is a consideration not worth raising.

    The Symposium is connected with the Phaedrus both in style and subject;
    they are the only Dialogues of Plato in which the theme of love is
    discussed at length. In both of them philosophy is regarded as a sort of
    enthusiasm or madness; Socrates is himself 'a prophet new inspired' with
    Bacchanalian revelry, which, like his philosophy, he characteristically
    pretends to have derived not from himself but from others. The Phaedo also
    presents some points of comparison with the Symposium. For there, too,
    philosophy might be described as 'dying for love;' and there are not
    wanting many touches of humour and fancy, which remind us of the Symposium.
    But while the Phaedo and Phaedrus look backwards and forwards to past and
    future states of existence, in the Symposium there is no break between this
    world and another; and we rise from one to the other by a regular series of
    steps or stages, proceeding from the particulars of sense to the universal
    of reason, and from one universal to many, which are finally reunited in a
    single science (compare Rep.). At first immortality means only the
    succession of existences; even knowledge comes and goes. Then follows, in
    the language of the mysteries, a higher and a higher degree of initiation;
    at last we arrive at the perfect vision of beauty, not relative or
    changing, but eternal and absolute; not bounded by this world, or in or out
    of this world, but an aspect of the divine, extending over all things, and
    having no limit of space or time: this is the highest knowledge of which
    the human mind is capable. Plato does not go on to ask whether the
    individual is absorbed in the sea of light and beauty or retains his
    personality. Enough for him to have attained the true beauty or good,
    without enquiring precisely into the relation in which human beings stood
    to it. That the soul has such a reach of thought, and is capable of
    partaking of the eternal nature, seems to imply that she too is eternal
    (compare Phaedrus). But Plato does not distinguish the eternal in man from
    the eternal in the world or in God. He is willing to rest in the
    contemplation of the idea, which to him is the cause of all things (Rep.),
    and has no strength to go further.

    The Symposium of Xenophon, in which Socrates describes himself as a pander,
    and also discourses of the difference between sensual and sentimental love,
    likewise offers several interesting points of comparison. But the
    suspicion which hangs over other writings of Xenophon, and the numerous
    minute references to the Phaedrus and Symposium, as well as to some of the
    other writings of Plato, throw a doubt on the genuineness of the work. The
    Symposium of Xenophon, if written by him at all, would certainly show that
    he wrote against Plato, and was acquainted with his works. Of this
    hostility there is no trace in the Memorabilia. Such a rivalry is more
    characteristic of an imitator than of an original writer. The (so-called)
    Symposium of Xenophon may therefore have no more title to be regarded as
    genuine than the confessedly spurious Apology.

    There are no means of determining the relative order in time of the
    Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo. The order which has been adopted in this
    translation rests on no other principle than the desire to bring together
    in a series the memorials of the life of Socrates.
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