Book V: Chapter 2 - Page 2

and a-half per cent., and its capital at ten millions
seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the neat annual profit,
after paying the expense of management, must amount, it is said,
to five hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds.
Government, it is pretended, could borrow this capital at three
per cent. interest, and, by taking the management of the bank
into its own hands, might make a clear profit of two hundred and
sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a-year. The orderly,
vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies
as those of Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears
from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of
this kind. But whether such a government us that of England,
which, whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous for
good economy; which, in time of peace, has generally conducted
itself with the slothful and negligent profusion that is,
perhaps, natural to monarchies ; and, in time of war, has
constantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance that
democracies are apt to fall into, could be safely trusted with
the management of such a project, must at least be a good deal
more doubtful.

The post-office is properly a mercantile project. The government
advances the expense of establishing the different offices, and
of buying or hiring the necessary horses or carriages, and is
repaid, with a large profit, by the duties upon what is carried.
It is, perhaps, the only mercantile project which has been
successfully managed by, I believe, every sort of government. The
capital to be advanced is not very considerable. There is no
mystery in the business. The returns are not only certain but
immediate.

Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other
mercantile projects, and have been willing, like private persons,
to mend their fortunes, by becoming adventurers in the common
branches of trade. They have scarce ever succeeded. The profusion
with which the affairs of princes are always managed, renders it
almost impossible that they should. The agents of a prince regard
the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at what
price they buy, are careless at what price they sell, are
careless at what expense they transport his goods from one place
to another. Those agents frequently live with the profusion of
princes ; and sometimes, too, in spite of that profusion, and by
a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes
of princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that
the agents of Lorenzo of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities,
carried on his trade. The republic of Florence was several
times obliged to pay the debt into which their extravagance had