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    Chapter 6: Weak Points and Strong

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    [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as
    follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the
    offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with
    direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself
    first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his
    attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of
    varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the
    subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or
    indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the
    perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above
    methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the
    chapter on Energy."]

    1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits
    the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is
    second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
    2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the
    enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

    [One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own
    terms or fights not at all. [1] ]

    3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
    to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
    make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

    [In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the
    second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy
    will have to defend.]

    4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

    [This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-
    Ch'en's interpretation of I. ss. 23.]

    if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly
    encamped, he can force him to move.
    5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
    march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
    6. An army may march great distances without distress, if
    it marches through country where the enemy is not.

    [Ts'ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d.
    like "a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun
    places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]

    7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you
    only attack places which are undefended.

    [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that
    is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the
    soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the
    precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or
    provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst

    You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
    positions that cannot be attacked.

    [I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned
    above. There is rather a nice point involved in the
    interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei
    Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your
    defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that are
    not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more,
    then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the
    clause balances less well with the preceding--always a
    consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural
    to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the
    mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from
    the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it
    impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so,
    the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy
    cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense hides in the most
    secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy
    to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I
    shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."]

    8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent
    does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose
    opponent does not know what to attack.

    [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.]

    9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we
    learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

    [Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of
    course with reference to the enemy.]

    and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
    10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you
    make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from
    pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
    11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
    engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and
    a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he
    will be obliged to relieve.

    [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can
    cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he
    will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our
    attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu,
    unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in
    frontal attacks.]

    12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy
    from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be
    merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw
    something odd and unaccountable in his way.

    [This extremely concise expression is intelligibly
    paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have constructed
    neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch'uan says: "we puzzle him by
    strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the
    meaning by three illustrative anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who
    when occupying Yang-p'ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I,
    suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and
    flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in
    sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding
    had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush,
    actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is
    advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the
    timely use of "bluff."]

    13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
    invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while
    the enemy's must be divided.

    [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu
    (after Mei Yao-ch'en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's
    dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;
    whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will
    be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack
    from every quarter."]

    14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must
    split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted
    against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be
    many to the enemy's few.
    15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
    with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
    16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
    known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible
    attack at several different points;

    [Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's
    victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully
    employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most
    of what he was going to do himself."]

    and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the
    numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be
    proportionately few.
    17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken
    his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
    should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
    he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends
    reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

    [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we
    read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent
    detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience
    attempt to protect every point, while those who are better
    acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object
    in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small
    misfortunes to avoid greater."]

    18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
    possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our
    adversary to make these preparations against us.

    [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to
    compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate
    superior force against each fraction in turn."]

    19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we
    may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

    [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation
    of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which
    enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and
    rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the
    right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in
    overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions
    which military history records, one of the most dramatic and
    decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical
    moment on the field of Waterloo.]

    20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left
    wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally
    impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear,
    or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest
    portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and
    even the nearest are separated by several LI!

    [The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
    precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is
    probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
    separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
    date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed
    at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and
    place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army
    in detail. Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do
    not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
    day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited
    through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold
    will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we
    shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual
    support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear,
    especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
    and hindmost divisions of the army."]

    21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh
    exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in
    the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

    [Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two
    states ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien
    and its incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun
    Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4.
    Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy,
    which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical
    Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without
    being able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that
    'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the
    former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under
    discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one
    cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage
    refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun
    Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and
    place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that
    victory can be achieved."]

    22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent
    him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the
    likelihood of their success.

    [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know
    beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's

    23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or

    [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by
    the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude
    whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances
    the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful present of a
    woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his
    Fabian tactics.]

    Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable
    24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so
    that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is

    [Cf. IV. ss. 6.]

    25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you
    can attain is to conceal them;

    [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation.
    Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra
    ss. 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans
    that are formed in your brain.]

    conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying
    of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest

    [Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and
    capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against

    26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
    own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
    27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what
    none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

    [I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won;
    what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations
    which has preceded the battle.]

    28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
    victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
    variety of circumstances.

    [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-
    principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it
    are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The
    rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a
    week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen
    diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an
    army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to
    write like Gibbon."]

    29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
    natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
    30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to
    strike at what is weak.

    [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.]

    31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the
    ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in
    relation to the foe whom he is facing.
    32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so
    in warfare there are no constant conditions.
    33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
    opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-
    born captain.
    34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are
    not always equally predominant;

    [That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate

    the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

    [Literally, "have no invariable seat."]

    There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning
    and waxing.

    [Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to
    illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly
    taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy,
    however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu
    mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]

    [1] See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902
    ed., vol. II, p. 490.
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